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LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND SEX: 
BREAKING THE SILENCE 
ON THE ETHICAL AND 
LIABILITY ISSUES 
CAROLINE FORELL* 
Over against one wall was a black 
leather couch - not a davenport, not a settee, 
but simply a battered old leather couch. I 
was determined that the psychiatrists 
couldn't hog all the comfort. My waggish 
Irish lawyer friend Parnell McCarthy occa-
sionally teased me that here is where I test-
ed the virtue of my lady divorce clients. 1 
The State Bar said it will not file charges 
that (Marvin) Mitchelson sexually assault-
ed former clients Patricia French and 
Kristin Barrett-Whitney. The bar conclud-
ed that the women, who complained about 
the alleged rapes more than three years 
ago, had given insufficient evidence of mis-
conduct. 
Each woman claims she was raped by 
Mitchelson in his private bathroom which is 
connected to his office. The bathroom is 
styled like a master bath in a home, with a 
whirlpool-size tub, wall-to-wall carpeting 
and the infamous wallpaper: a tapestry of 
hundreds of Rubenesque nudes. 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; J.D. University 
oflowa, 1978. My thanks to Sarah Krick for her valuable research and editing con-
tributions to this Article and for her friendship. My thanks also to Chapin Clark, Ellen 
Adler and Suzanne Chanti for their helpful insights. Finally, my thanks to the 
Women's Law Forum students at Golden Gate Law School, most notably Suzanne 
Bachman, Paula Ohliger, and Fran Radford for their assistance in preparing this 
Article for publication and to Nancy Farmer for her tireless clerical support. 
1. ROBERT TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER 5-6 (1958). 
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The Los Angeles County District 
Attorney's Office decided in early 1987 not 
to prosecute the rape charges, citing a lack 
of evidence. French then sued Mitchelson 
for sexual assault and lost in Los Angeles 
Superior Court; Barrett-Whitney sued but 
has not brought her case to trial. 
However, a state victim's compensation 
board awarded $46,000 to Barrett-Whitney 
and $10,000 to French to pay for medical and 
psychiatric treatment, putting pressure on 
the State Bar investigation. A Los Angeles 
County grand juror fueled the controversy 
when he resigned over the district attor-
ney's handling of the case. 
Meanwhile, another woman sued 
Mitchelson for malpractice and claimed that 
he used her for sex. She won the case but 
received no damages.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than a few divorce lawyers have sex with their clients.3 
They aren't the only ones. Caselaw reveals that attorneys in 
other specialties do too.· The overwhelming number of cases 
where a lawyer's sexual relations with a client reach the atten-
tion of the public involve male attorneys and their female 
clients.6 These cases do not involve violation of ethical rules 
2. L.A. Daily J., May 2, 1990, at 11, col. 3. 
3. See, e.g., Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990); 
Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990); In re Frick, 694 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo. 1985). 
4. See, e.g., In re Ofelt, 1 D.B. Rptr. 22 (Or. 1985); In re Gibson, 124 Wis. 2d 466, 
369 N.W.2d 695 (1985); In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. 1986); In re Wolf, 312 Or. 
655, _ P.2d _ (1992). 
5. P. RUTTER, SEX IN THE FORBIDDEN ZONE 22 (1989) "96% ... of sexual exploita-
tion by professionals occurs between a man in power and a woman in his care .... " See 
also Lyon, Sexual Exploitation of Divorce Clients: The Lawyer Prerogative?, 10 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 159, 168 (1987). See also D. MARSTON, MALICE AFORETHOUGHT: How 
LAWYERS USE OUR SECRET RULES TO GET RICH, GET SEX, GET EVEN ... AND GET AWAY 
WITH IT 142 (1991). 
In other areas involving sex with professionals the numbers are the same. "The over· 
welming number oflawsuits alleging psychiatric malpractice because of sexual involve· 
ment [are] brought by women.· LeBoeuf, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women 
Patients, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 83, 84 (1988). LeBoeuf also points out that women are 
almost always the victims. Id. (citing Belote, Sexual Intimacy Between Female Clients and 
Male Psychotherapists: Masochistic Sabotage, in 38 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 887-
B (1978); Bouhoutsos, Holroyd, Lerman, Forer & Greenberg, Sexual Intimacy Between 
Psychotherapists and Patients, 14 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & FMC. 185 (1983». 
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specifically addressed to attorney-client sexual relationships 
because there are no such rules in any American jurisdiction. 
This paper examines the existing caselaw concerning attor-
ney-client sexual relationships and the current ethical rules 
which may be implicated. Because of the inadequacies in the 
present system, and the serious harm caused to both women 
clients and the Bar by these inadequacies, I propose changes 
in how lawyers regulate themselves and how others are 
compensated for lawyer's sexual misconduct. 
Some situations where a client complains about her attor-
ney's sexual misconduct are so egregious that the Bar and 
courts have no choice but to act. For example, when Jack R. 
Wood came before the Indiana Supreme Court for the second 
time because he demanded his client perform oral sex in return 
for legal services (known as "quid pro quo" sexual miscon-
duct), the court concluded that the previous one-year suspen-
sionS meted out ten years earlier was not severe enough 
discipline; it disbarred him.7 (This time, he had also required 
his 16-year-old criminal client to perform in pornographic 
films in exchange for representation.)8 One shudders to think 
what other sexual misconduct Wood had practiced unpun-
ished during the years between his reinstatement and the 
bringing of the new charges. 
Cases like that of Jack Wood, however, are the easy ones. 
Hard cases involve a well-respected lawyer and his client 
who either did not verbally object to having sex at the time or 
who, although she protested at first, eventually succumbed 
without physical coercion.9 These are the cases where lawyers 
6. In re Wood, 265 Ind. 616, 358 N.E.2d 128 (1976). 
7. In re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. 1986). See also D. MARsTON, supra note 
3, at 141-42. 
8. In re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1986). 
Id. at 1190. 
On December 15, 1983, the niece left 'Naked City' when she 
became frightened by the increasingly violent nature of the 
movies. Respondent called the niece into his office and 
requested to see the pictures taken at 'Naked City'. 
Respondent asked the niece to make a payment toward the 
legal fees owed from her earnings and then offered to reduce 
his fee in exchange for oral sex. The niece performed oral sex 
with the Respondent in his office. 
9. See, e.g., Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill. App. 3d 918,565 N.E.2d 101 (1990); 
Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H. 1990). 
3
Forell: Lawyers, Clients and Sex
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
614 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:611 
demand that their "right of privacy" and "freedom of associa-
tion" be honored,lo because, after all, "she consented." 
These cases also raise the specter of "he said/she said." 
Americans have great difficulty believing a woman's charge of 
rape or sexual battery when a more socially powerful male 
denies it, claiming that it didn't happen, that she initiated it, 
or she consented to it. Our post-Anita HilVClarence Thomas 
society remains uncertain about the appropriate response to 
these claims of rights and freedoms among "consenting" adults. 
The right of privacy is often a double-edged sword for 
women. Much of the harm women suffer at the hands of men, 
including domestic violence, marital rape, and sexual harass-
ment in the workplace, occurs in the private spheres of home 
or private sector employment. Behind closed doors men have 
been exerting their physical and sexual power over women since 
time immemorial. Sex with a client will almost always occur 
behind such a closed door. 
The right to privacy is an especially suspect defense where 
one of the parties is an officer of the court with a fiduciary obli-
gation to protect the other party's interests. II Similarly, free-
dom of association has limits where sex is involved. The 
United States Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick l2 that 
even consensual sexual relations between adult lovers in their 
home can be prosecuted as criminal conduct. It therefore fol-
lows that neither a state or federal court should find that a pro-
hibition of sexual conduct between a fiduciary and his 
beneficiary violates the fiduciary's constitutional right to 
freely associate. Certainly none of the numerous prohibitions 
on sex with clients in other professions where a fiduciary rela-
tionship is recognized, such as social workers, psychologists and 
psychiatrists, have raised constitutional concerns. IS 
10. See, e.g., Memorandum to Cal. Board B. Governors, Sex-with-Client 
Subcomm., Cal. Board B. Governors 5-10 (Apr.10, 1991) [hereinafter B. Governors 
Memorandum]. 
11. The right to privacy argument was rejected in Barbara A v. John G, 145 Cal. 
App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430 (1983). But see B. Governors Memorandum, supra 
note 8 (voicing serious concern with this issue). 
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). (Homosexual sodomy is not protected by the U.S. 
Constitution. I find the holding in Bowers outrageous; nevertheless, it is the law of 
the land.) 
13. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.22.2 (West 1988) (therapist-patient sex a 
felony); MINN. STAT. § 148A.02 (1988) (tort liability for therapist-client sex). 
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II. HOW I SELECTED THIS TOPIC 
The questions of whether it is unethical for an attorney to 
have sex with his client and whether tort liability should be 
imposed when attorney-client sexual relations injure the client 
have only recently come to the attention of the public and the 
Bar. When I attended law school in the mid-seventies, my 
Professional Responsibility class did not cover this issue. Nor 
is it addressed in many of the legal ethicstextbooks.14 
However, my first-year Torts students hear about this issue 
within their first few weeks oflaw school. In keeping with tra-
dition, I begin the course with intentional torts. One of the 
cases my students read on this topic is the California case of 
Barbara A. v. John a. 16 I use this case to demonstrate how a 
battery can occur even when a person has consented to phys-
ical contact, if the basis for the consent was misrepresentation 
or deceit. 
Barbara A. is a very disturbing case that brings first-year 
law students face to face with both the responsibilities and the 
power attorneys have, as well as the pure chutzpah of some of 
our less ethical brethren. John is a family law attorney and 
Barbara is his former client. John, notably, is the plaintiff in 
the case. John sues Barbara for fees he alleges she owes to him 
for his representation of her in a post-divorce child and spousal 
support matter. According to Barbara's cross-complaint, John 
and Barbara had sexual intercourse twice during the time 
John represented her. Prior to their first sexual encounter, 
Barbara demanded that John use a condom, but he told her not 
to worry, saying: "I can't possibly get anyone pregnant." She 
understood this to mean he was sterile and proceeded to 
engage in unprotected sex with him. As a result, she suffered 
an ectoptic pregnancy and required surgery to save her life. 
Although my main purpose in using the case is to demon-
strate that consent will be invalidatedifits scope is exceeded 
or if it was fraudulently induced,16 my students also examine 
the ethical issue Barbara raises by alleging that she believed 
John's assurances because "[t]he attorney-client relationship 
14. See, e.g., T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS 
& MATERIALS (5th ed. 1991). 
15. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983). 
16. [d. at 373, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 426. 
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produced in [her] a sense of trust in [John], and shejustifiaby 
relied on his representations."17 
The Barbara A. court examines the issue of whether the 
attorney-client fiduciary duty applies to sexual relations 
between an attorney and his client. It concludes that the 
fiduciary duty can be breached where physical injury is alleged 
to have resulted from its breach. 18 However, contrary to the 
ordinary rule of fiduciary duty, which presumes undue influ-
ence if a breach of a fiduciary duty is alleged,19 the court holds 
that where the injury results from attorney-client sex, the 
client has the burden of proving that her attorney's conduct was 
wrongful. 20 
Since the California court notes that Oregon is the only 
state bar to have directly addressed the ethical considera-
tions attorney-client sex presents (via an advisory ethical 
opinion)21, a discussion of this matter is particularly appropriate 
for Oregon law students. I inform my students that present-
ly no state bar has an ethical rule specifically regulating attor-
neys' sexual relations with clients, and ask whether this is 
appropriate. 
The Barbara A. case has bothered me for years. My areas 
oflegal expertise include the interrelationship of statutes and 
tort law and legal issues affecting women. While on sabbati-
cal in Australia last year, I received an invitation from Golden 
Gate University School of Law asking me to submit a propos-
al for a paper concerning women and the practice of law. My 
concerns about whether attorney-client sexual relationships 
violate ethical rules and the possibility for these rules to be the 
basis for civil liability led me to propose my present paper. 
Because I was in Australia at the time I made my proposal, I 
was unaware that these issues had moved to the front burner 
in three states: California, Oregon and Illinois. As my dean 
responded when I recently described my research: "Cutting 
edgel" 
17. 1d. 
18. 1d. at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
19.1d. 
20. 1d. The court explains: "To hold otherwise would have a chilling and far-reach-
ing effect on any personal relations between an attorney and his clients. The possi-
bility of a factual determination of a confidential relationship should be sufficient 
warning to monitor the profession in personal or social relations with clients." 1d. at 
379-80; 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33. 
21. Or. Board of Governors, Legal Ethics Op. 475 (1982) [hereinafter Op. 475]. 
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III. CUTTING EDGE 
This paper is a tale of three states. The problems that attor-
ney-client sexual relationships present exist in every juris-
diction, yet California, Illinois and Oregon are the only states 
where there has been strong interest in the issue.22 The Oregon 
bar is the only one to address these issues without public 
prodding. In contrast, the California bar has been forced to con-
sider these issues by legislative mandate23 and the Illinois 
bar has been forced to consider these issues after widely pub-
licized litigation by clients against their attorneys who had sex 
with them.24 
The publicity about the legislation, proposed ethical rules, 
attorney debate and civil litigation in California, Illinois and 
Oregon has gone national. The New York Times25 and the 
ABA Journa}26 have both published articles on the topic. 
However, according to the February 1992 issue of the ABA 
Journal, the issue may already be a dead letter. Pointing to the 
defeat of a rule in Oregon in October 1991, the California 
Supreme Court's failure to adopt a rule despite a legislative 
command to do so and the Illinois Supreme Court's failure to 
act on this issue despite a legislative resolution, the ABA says 
the movement to restrict attorney-client sex has "stumbled" and 
"slowed. "27 This issue must not fade from view. The harm to 
22. See also Ala. B. Ass'n Comm. on Ethics Op. 88-1 (1988) cited in Report by 
SUbcomm. on Attorney-Client Sexual Misconduct, Chicago B. Ass'n Comm. on 
Professional Responsibility 28 (Oct. 18, 1991) [hereinafter Chicago B. Ass'n Report] 
(The Alaska opinion concluded that: 
(1) the lawyer initiates the relationship and the client's 
ability to make a free choice is impaired; 
(2) the lawyer performs legal services in exchange for sex; 
(3) the sexual involvement inhibits the lawyer's ability to 
protect the client's interest; 
(4) the sexual relationship may adversely atTect the client's 
emotional stability; or 
(5) the sexual conduct is illega!.). 
23. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106.8 (West 1989). 
24. See, e.g., Grady, Crawford & Obrien, Lawyers Exposing "Dirty Little Secret", 
Chicago Tribune, Jan. 21, 1992; Wesniewski, Sex with Clients an Unfair Affair, 
Chicago Daily Law Bull. 1989, at 1; Warden, Secret Suits, Chicago Lawyer, Apr. 18, 
1989, at 1; Gill & Holt, Lawyers Debate Attorney· Client Sex Rule, Chicago Lawyer, Sept. 
1991, at 1. 
25. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1991, Law Section. 
26. Attorney Discipline: Do we need an ethical rule restricting sexual relations with 
clients?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 34-5; California Restricts Attorney-Client Sex, A.B.A. 
J., July 1992, at 26. 
27. Sex-With-Client Ban Fails, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 24. 
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the clients and to the Bar in the absence of a rule expressly con-
demning exploitative sexual relations between attorneys and 
clients is simply too great to ignore. 
Until the 1980's, virtually nothing had been written about 
the ethics of professionals having sex with their clients, 
whether the professionals were psychotherapists, clergy, teach-
ers,28 doctors or lawyers. 29 Since then a few articles have 
addressed the problems created when divorce attorneys have 
sex with their clients.so 
The caselaw is equally scanty. Only three cases have 
addressed the issue of whether an attorney can be held civil-
ly liable for injuries resulting from sexual intercourse with his 
client: Barbara A. v. John G.31 in 1983; Suppressed v. 
28. When I mentioned my views on the topic of attorney-client sex to one of my 
former students who now practices law, he immediately asked !De whether I believed 
the same prohibitions should apply to law professor-student sex. My answer is a 
resounding "yes." The same power dynamics exist in the teacher-student relationship 
as well as the same potential for severe psychological harm. Furthermore, the teach-
er-student relationship has the added negative effect on other students in the class. 
I advocate a rule like the one in effect at the University ofIowa which says: 
No faculty member shall have an amorous relationship (con-
sensual or otherwise) with a student who is enrolled in a 
course being taught by the faculty member or whose academic 
work (including work as a teaching assistant) is being super-
vised by the faculty member. 
Faculty members exercise power over students, whether in 
giving them praise or criticism, evaluating them, making 
recommendations for their further studies or their future 
employment, or conferring any other benefits on them. 
Amorous relationships between faculty members and stu-
de1nts are wrong when the faculty member has professional 
responsibility for the student. Such situations greatly increase 
the chances that the faculty member will abuse his or her 
power and sexually exploit the student. Voluntary consent 
by the student in such a relationship is suspect, given the fun-
damentally asymmetric nature of the relationship. 
P. RU'M'ER, supra note 5, at 188. 
29. P. RUITER, supra note 5 at 36. In recent years a number of articles have been 
written concerning various professions. See, e.g., LeBoeuf, supra note 5 (psychiatrist-
patient sex); Cruz, When the Shepard Preys on the Flock: Clergy Sexual Exploitation 
and the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 499 (1991) (clergy-parishioner sex). 
See generally Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair 
Advantage of the "Fair" Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95 (1988). 
30. See Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits?, 1 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 585 (1988); Lyon, supra note 5. See also Angel, Sexual Harassment by 
Judges, 45 MIAMI L. REV. 817 (1991). 
31. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983). See also McDaniel v. Gile, 
230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991) (Intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and attorney malpractice allowed where attorney failed to effectively represent 
his divorce client because she refused his sexual advances.). 
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Suppressed32 in 1990; and Doe v. Roe33 in 1991. The latter two 
cases were brought by two different female clients against 
the same well-known Chicago divorce lawyer, who remains 
nameless by court order.:U This attorney successfully enjoined 
at least one of these women from mentioning his or his firm's 
name and had the records sealed from public view.36 The cir-
cumstances surrounding the two Chicago cases are compelling 
evidence of a conspiracy to silence the voices of women who 
claim their lawyers sexually exploited them. As one judge has 
described it, it is the Illinois bar's "dirty little secret. "36 
Another reason why this topic is compelling is the mount-
ing evidence of the psychological damage to clients caused by 
sexual relations between male professionals and their female 
clients, including male lawyers and their female clients. 
Psychiatrist Peter Rutter's book Sex in the Forbidden Zone, 37 
explains, through the use of numerous case studies, the caus-
es and effects of male professionals' sexual relations with 
their female clients. Rutter's book shows both why the temp-
tation to engage in such conduct is so great for a powerful pro-
fessional male and why a vulnerable female client is not in a 
position to resist.38 Rutter also describes the magnitude of the 
psychological damage such relationships cause. Because this 
book is so illuminating, I agree with Carol Nadelson, M.D., Past 
President of the American Psychiatric Association, who says 
that Rutter's book is "[a] landmark book [which] should be read 
32. 206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990). 
33. 756 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
34. Doe, 756 F. Supp. 353, 360 n.13. 
35. See Warden, supra note 24, at I, 9. The suppression order stated, among other 
things: 
(1) The record on appeal and trial record is suppressed and 
impounded and, when filed, will be maintained in the office 
of Gilbert Marchman, Clerk of the Appellate Court, by a 
single clerk designated by him as custodian of the file. 
(2) During the period ofthis order, the said file and record 
shall remain suppressed and impounded and plaintiff, defen-
dants, their agents and attorneys are ordered to refrain 
from disclosing or publishing its contents and particularly the 
names of the parties and their families, if any, during the 
period of this order. 
Suppressed v. Suppressed, Suppression Order No.89-2950 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 
1989). 
36. In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991) 
(Greiman, J., specially concurring). 
37. P. RUTTER, supra note 5. 
38. See also D. MARsTEN, supra note 5 (providing a vivid account of the prevalence 
of sexual exploitation of women clients by their attorneys). 
9
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by physicians, therapists, teachers, clergy and lawyers. "39 If! 
were teaching a class in Professional Responsibility, it would 
be required reading. 
In the space remaining I will first explain why attorney-
client sex is a women's issue. I will then discuss why the fail-
ure to expressly prohibit attorney-client sexual relations is 
detrimental to the legal profession. I will briefly examine the 
treatment of the issue in Oregon and California. Then, I will 
present and discuss the ethical rule that I propose for adoption 
by state bar associations. Next, I will analyze the possible 
avenues for civil liability against lawyers who sexually exploit 
their clients under both the current ethical rules and adviso-
ry opinions and under more specific rules if they were adopt-
ed. I will argue for the legislative enactment of statutory 
liability should the courts refuse to allow a civil remedy. I will 
conclude with the chilling story of the judicial protection of 
attorney-client sex in a series of Illinois cases. 
IV. SEX WITH CLIENTS: A WOMEN'S ISSUE 
When sex between an attorney and his client occurs, there 
is usually a convergence of two power relationships: attor-
ney-client and man-woman. Since the overwhelming majority 
of cases involve male attorneys and their female clients, it 
should be acknowledged that this, like sexual harassment, is 
a women's issue. 4o It is also important to recognize that the 
harm a woman client may suffer from sexual involvement 
with her attorney will be both different and frequently more 
severe than the harm a male client might suffer. 
Gender is still a hierarchy in our patriarchal society and the 
power a attorney has over his client is enhanced by the power 
39. P. RU'M'ER, supra note 5, at 1. 
40. I am treating this as a woman's issue despite the fact that, like sexual 
harassment and domestic violence, occasionally the injured party will be male. Cf. Gill 
& Holt, Lawyers Debate Attorney-Client Sex Rule, CHICAGO LAWYER, Sept. 1991, at 10 
(where California legislator Lucille Roybal-Allard, who introduced legislation in 
California which mandates that the bar adopt a rule regulating attorney- client sex-
ual relations, stated: 
When we talk about this issue, we usually talk about it in 
terms of men taking advantage of women .... But we had 
calls from male clients saying they had experiences with 
female attorneys. We also had calls from gays who had that 
experience with male attorneys, so it isn't just a women's 
issue). 
10
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he holds over her as a male. This is particularly true when the 
relationship changes from strictly business to personal and sex-
ual. Research has shown that men and women view sexual 
approaches in business settings very differently. In a recent 
hostile work environment sexual harassment case, Robinson 
v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.:1 Dr. Susan Fiske, Professor of 
Psychology at the University of Massachussets, testifed that: 
Men and women respond to sex issues in the 
workplace to a degree that exceeds the nor-
mal differences in other perceptual reactions 
between them. For example, research reveals 
a near flip-flop of attitudes when both men 
and women are asked what their response 
would be to being sexually approached in the 
workplace. Approximately two-thirds of men 
said they would be flattered; only fifteen per-
cent would feel insulted. For women the pro-
portions are reversed.42 
It seems logical to assume that men and women's reac-
tions to sexual solicitations by professionals such as their 
attorneys is similar to their reactions to sexual solicitations in 
the workplace. 
Of course, the attorney is not always the initiator of a sex-
ual relationship. Nevertheless, because of the power the attor-
ney possesses and the client's vulnerability, dependency and trust 
in her attorney, it remains the attorney's responsibility to pre-
vent a sexual relationship from developing. I maintain that true 
consent to sexual intercourse during an attorney-client rela-
tionship will rarely occur. I believe that there are women clients 
who are capable of such consent, and that there are attorneys 
who are capable of retaining the necessary objectivity to ethically 
and effectively represent their client's interests while engaging 
in a sexual relationship. However, I also believe that it is the 
extraordinary situation where neither the client's interests nor 
the attorney's professional conduct are adversely affected by their 
sexual relationship. As a result, far more often than not, attor-
neys who have sex with their clients are guilty of, at a minimum, 
sexual exploitation. Their clients are indeed victims. 
41. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
42. 1d. at 1505. See also P. RUT1'ER, supra note 5, at 64·5 (concerning the different 
ways in which men and women view sexualizing of their professional relationship). 
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For women who have previously been the victims of male 
abuse of power, particulary sexual power, the sexualization of 
the attorney-client relationship is, as psychiatrist Peter Rutter 
describes it: "the destruction of hope itself."43 For women who 
are battered wives or incest or rape victims, the sexualization 
of the attorney-client relationship can be nothing less than emo-
tionally devastating. 
It is not surprising that most of the cases that have reached 
the public's attention have involved divorce attorneys. Usually 
the reason a woman consults a divorce attorney is that she 
believes that a man (her soon-to-be ex-husband) has . wronged 
her. She will often be emotionally distraught, and will be 
seeking someone who will listen and understand not only her 
legal but her personal problems.~ Her attorney will play the 
roles of both legal problem solver and counselor. 
Unfortunately, attorneys are not trained counselors and 
may be unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge the intoxicating 
effect that role can have on both the counselor and client. As 
one psychiatrist has noted: 
Due to the psychological tendency on the part of the client 
to invest the counselor with all sorts of power, authority, and 
a nearly magical belief in their helpfulness, there will ... be a 
powerful tendency to bestow affection. These feelings largely 
are unrelated to truly personal involvement, and are mostly a 
function of the relationship itself. Therefore, for a lawyer to 
take advantage of them, would be quite as unethical as mak-
ing personal use of the client's money or property which has 
been entrusted to him in the course of carrying out the pro-
fessional role.45 
The effect just described has a technical name: transference. 
Psychiatrist Peter Rutter describes this phenomenon as follows: 
Transference is a term used in psychother-
apy for the powerful feeling that patients 
develop toward their therapists. Transfer-
ence feelings are in some ways a reexperi-
43. P. RU'M'ER, supra note 5, at 62. 
44. See D. MARSTON, supra note 5 at 142·5 for a male perspective of what hap-
pens in this situation. 
45. Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAM. L. 7, 16 (1965). (Andrew S. 
Watson was an Associate Professor of Psychiatry of Michigan Medical School and an 
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School.) 
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encing of past emotional dynamics within 
the family, but in other ways they look to 
future possibilities for developing new and 
healthier emotional dynamics. For example, 
a patient trying to seduce a therapist may be 
repeating past injuries but is also most like-
ly searching for a response that will dis-
courage this repetition. The therapist draws 
these feelings out of clients because of the 
power he has either to reinjure his patients 
or to relate to them in a way that will free 
them from the wounds of the past .... 46 
623 
Rutter asserts that "similar transference dynamics take 
place in all ... lawyer-client relationships. "47 
A number of courts consider themselves to be transfer-
ence experts. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
found that unregistered psychologists' and social workers' 
relationships with their clients involve transference.48 It has 
therefore held that when these professionals engage in sex with 
their clients, they breach their fiduciary duty and are subject 
to civil tort liability for malpractice. In Corgan v. Meuhling, 
the supreme court quoted with approval an earlier lower appel-
late court case which said: 
The "transference phenomenon" ... has 
been defined in psychiatric practice as "a 
phenomenon ... by which the patient trans-
fers feeling toward everyone else to the doc-
tor, who then must react with a proper 
response, the countertransference, in order 
to avoid emotional involvement and assist 
the patient in overcoming problems." ... The 
mishandling of this phenomenon, which gen-
erally results in sexual relations or involve-
ment between the psychiatrist or therapist 
and the patient, has uniformly been con-
sidered as malpractice or gross negligence in 
other jurisdictions ... 49 
46. P. RU'ITER, supra note 5, at 50 (emphasis added). 
47. Id. See also A. STONE, LAw, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 199 (1984). 
48. See Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 474 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. 1985) 
(social worker); Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296,574 N.E.2d 602 (1991). 
49. Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 574 N.E.2d 602, 607 (1991). 
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In contrast, an Illinois appellate court has determined 
that a divorce attorney who engages in a sexual relationship 
with his female client does not breach his fiduciary obligation to 
her. The court concluded that an attorney's relationship with his 
client is distinguishable from that of a psychotherapist's because 
no transference takes place in an attorney-client relationship. 60 
Not all lawyers agree that transference does not occur in the 
attorney-client relationship. Errol Zavett, a member of the 
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers/1 says regarding 
attorney-client relationships: "There is considerable danger ... 
of transference ... In a way, it is like psychiatrists whose 
patients are in a vulnerable state.52 
Contrary to what the Illinois appellate courts may believe, 
it is self-evident that in at least some attorney-client rela-
tionships transference will occur. I remember a conversation 
I had with a successful local divorce attorney, during which he 
told me that his secret to success was his total management of 
every aspect of his female clients' lives. He said that they want 
him to take control, so he does. What he described is a situa-
tion where transference is very likely to occur. 
Since, unlike psychiatrists, attorneys are not trained to deal 
with transference, it is all the more likely that they will mis-
handle it by engaging in sexual relationships with their clients. 
This lack of training is a strong reason for a clear rule against 
attorneys having sex with their clients.53 
50. Suppressed v. Suppressed, 206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990), 
relJiew denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (1991). Accord Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 
1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (where the court stated: 
The crucial factor in the therapist-patient relationship which 
leads to imposition of legal liability for conduct which 
arguably is no more exploitative of a patient than sexual 
involvement of a lawyer with a client, a priest or minister 
with a parishioner, or a gynechologist with a patient is that 
lawyers, ministers and gynecologists do not offer a course of 
treatment and counseling predicated upon handling the 
transference phenomenon.). 
In other words, since this isn't in their job description, when it happens they aren't 
responsible for it! 
51. Errol Zavett served on a committee of the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers which produced a document called "Bounds of Advocacy - Standards of 
Conduct in Matrimonial Litigation." This publication is the source of a specific rule 
prohibiting sexual relationships between divorce lawyers and their clients. Rule 216 
provides: An attorney should never have a sexual relationship with a client or oppos-
ing counsel during the time of the representation. This rule has no disciplinary 
effect and is aspirational only. Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 10. 
52. Wesniewski, supra note 24, at 12. See also Lyon, supra note 5 at 162-6. 
53. Emotional damage is only one harm that a woman client may suffer from 
having sex with her attorney. She also runs the risk of getting pregnant, as occurred 
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A woman's harm differs from that of a man who has sex with 
his attorney because of our culture's double standard concern-
ing sex outside of marriage. As Professor Susan Estrich notes, 
"Men with active sex lives are normal, desirable, successful. 
Women are loose, easy, unworthy. Men are 'Don Juans'. Women 
are whores."64 This perception affects how the woman client 
views herself, how her attorney views her and, if their rela-
tionship comes to light, how society views her. It injures her. 
In certain contexts the harm a woman can suffer from 
attorney-client sex can be immeasurable. In the context of 
divorce, a woman who has an affair with her divorce attorney 
may lose custody of her children. This almost happened to the 
woman in Lehr and Lehr.55 In that case, custody of their 
young daughter was shifted to the father when the trial judge 
learned that the mother was living with her lawyer.56 The 
father had not sought custody but rather had approached the 
court about his duty to pay child support. The father acknowl-
edged in his brief that after his wife left him, he moved to a reli-
gious center where he was paid wages of $5.00 per week.67 
He conceded he had had alcohol problems during their mar-
riage, and that he was asked to leave the religious center 
after five months for "not cooperating".68 At the time of this 
appeal, he was earning $6.00 per month and was doing vol-
unteer work for the Joys of Ministry, so that the child was 
placed with a babysitter every day but Sunday and even 
in Barbara A, contracting a venereal disease or even AIDS. Women are much more 
likely to contract AIDS from a male sexual partner than vice versa. Heterosexual men 
infected with AIDS are at least 17.5 times more likely to transmit the disease to women 
through sex than the other way around. Ms., JanlFeb., 1992, at 76; the Eugene 
Register·Guard, Sept. 25, 1991, at 6a. 
If a woman has the extreme misfortune to hire a male attorney who is a sexual 
predator, her risk of contracting venereal disease and AIDS are especially high. See 
P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 41 (noting "that most men who violate the forbidden zone 
are so·called repeaters who serially exploit woman after woman."). One of the harms 
that the woman in Doe v. Roe alleged she suffered from her sexual relationship with 
her divorce attorney was the exposure to such risks. She alleged that "Roe engaged 
in sexual relations with numerous sexual partners, including at 'swinger' parties, and 
that posed an 'unusual risk' of life· threatening sexually transmitted infection." She 
also alleged that it was Roe's "regular practice to attempt to persuade female divorce 
clients that he found attractive to submit to his sexual demands." 756 F.Supp. 353, 
356 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
54. Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 849 (1991). See D. MARsTON, supra 
note 3, at 138-9 for a lurid account of an attorney who viewed his female client as a 
whore. 
55. 36 Or. App. 23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978). 
56. [d. 
57. Appellant's Brief, Lehr v. Lehr, 36 Or. App. 23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978). 
58. [d. 
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occasionally overnight. 59 Despite these facts, the trial judge's 
outrage over the mother's decision to "live in sin" with her 
lawyer led the judge to find that it was in the three year old 
daughter's best interests to live with the father.6o 
This case highlights the serious risks which attorney-client 
sex poses to a client's interests in the divorce context. As 
noted in the discussion section to Oregon Legal Ethics Opinion 
No. 475 concerning the question of whether it is unethical for 
a divorce lawyer to have sex with his client: 
The lawyer representing one spou~e in a dis-
solution proceeding cannot know with cer-
tainty whether a reconciliation is possible or 
is in the best interest of the client, or how the 
possibility of reconciliation might be affected 
by an affair between the lawyer and the client. 
Nor can the lawyer know with certainty what 
reaction the client's spouse would have to 
learning that the lawyer is having an affair 
during the dissolution proceedings, or how 
such knowledge might affect the negotiation of 
property rights and, if children are involved, 
the right to custody .... The potential for prej-
udice to the client is immense.61 
Another example of the risks attorney-client sex poses in the 
divorce court is set out in Doe v. Roe.62 Here the woman client's 
husband decided not to pay his wife's attorney fees once he dis-
covered she was having sex with her lawyer. The financial risks 
for women clients will often be substantially greater than 
those of men clients since most women are significantly poor-
er than their soon-to-be ex-husbands. This also makes them 
easy prey for a lawyer who views sex for services as an appro-
priate quid pro quo. 
I spoke with Jeanne Metzger, the woman who brought the 
$uppressed v. Suppressed suit against her divorce attorney for 
the harm she suffered from her sexual encounters with him. In 
59. rd. 
60. The trial court's decision was reversed on appeal. Lehr v. Lehr, 36 Or. App. 
23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978). 
61. Op. 475, supra note 21. See also Comm. on Professional Responsibility and 
Conduct, State B. CaL, Formal Op. 1987-92, cited in Nat'l Rptr. on Legal Ethics 35 n.8 
(1988) [hereinafter Op. 1987-921; P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 32-3. 
62. 756 F. Supp. 353, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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a written statement she describes what happened to her as 
follows: 
I had seen the Hansen [pseudonym] firm 
featured on Phil Donahue Show, and also 
featured in the local newspapers. They had 
a reputation for representing women in 
divorce cases, so I selected that firm pre-
cisely because I felt vulnerable and fearful 
and wanted a lawyer I could depend on. Mr. 
Hansen seemed to be a forceful and power-. 
ful attorney ..... 
The first sexual encounter [occurred 
when] Mr. Hansen instructed me to come 
to his office on a Saturday. When I arrived, 
there were file folders on all the chairs, leav-
ing only one place for me to sit: a couch. 
Mr. Hansen said, 'Just have a seat,' so I sat 
down on the couch. 
The events of the next few moments hap-
pened quickly.. First Mr. Hansen braced a 
chair against the door, under the knob. I 
couldn't believe my eyes. I was shocked and 
speechless. He sat down next to me on the 
couch, unzipped his pants, and forced my 
head down into his lap, compelling me to 
perform oral sex. He said, 'You don't have to 
do this if you don't want to' - hardly an 
accurate statement since I was no match 
for him physically and was unable to free 
myself from his grasp. After he released 
his hold on me, I sat up. I was in a state of 
shock and disbelief. I felt confused, humil-
iated and degraded. ... He couldn't have 
had a more powerful effect on me if he had 
held a gun to my head.63 
During our phone conversation Metzger told me that she 
retained a new attorney after their third sexual encounter 
because, while "some women barter that way" she wasn't one 
ofthem.64 She also said the power she felt her attorney had over 
63. Statement of Jeanne Metzger (1989). 
64. Telephone interview with Jeanne Metzger (Jan. 28, 1992). 
17
Forell: Lawyers, Clients and Sex
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
628 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:611 
her because of the prospect oflosing her children made her feel 
like she was "going out before a firing squad. "66 
Similarly, a woman interviewed in Peter Rutter's book 
descibed "the helplessness leading to psychic numbing that she 
felt at the moment her attorney told her he would abandon a 
lawsuit for her house unless she agreed to have sex."66 She said: 
There is no way to control anything. 
When this happens, there is no boundary to 
the self. There is no self. Anybody can do 
anything he wants to you. You have no 
power, no control, no choice. You can't say 
yes or no.67 
What must it feel like to undergo such an ordeal? The 
betrayal of trust, fear of reprisal, the guilt and the shame are 
injuries that I believe the law should recognize and compensate. 
These experiences are women's experiences. What happened 
to these women simply does not happen to men.68 
The only two cases I know of that involve a sexual rela-
tionship between a female attorney and a male client only 
serve to further illustrate the difference in how society views 
men and women's sexual conduct. The only reported case I 
have located in which a woman attorney was disciplined for sex-
ualization of an attorney-client relationship involved a crim-
inal defense attorney and her client. In Committee on 
Professional Ethics v. Durham,69 Leona Durham appealed her 
65.Id. 
66. P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 153. 
67. Id. See also Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gibson, 124 Wis. 2d 466, 469, 
369 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1985) (When client Slane visited her attorney's office to discuss 
obtaining a restraining order against her abusive husband her attorney "turned the 
office lights otT, knelt beside Mrs. Slane's chair, began kissing her, put his hands inside 
her blouse and fondled her breasts, and moved his hands over her pelvic area outside 
her clothing. In order to stop him, Mrs. Slane told him she was visualizing being beat-
en and was frightened. "). 
68. These women are being treated "as women." See MacKinnon, From Practice 
to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J. OF LAW & FEMINISM 13, 15 
(1991). 
69. 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979). When I first heard about the Durham case I won-
dered why she was treated so harshly relative to the treatment of other lawyers who 
are charged with much more serious sexual misconduct. When I looked at the actu-
al case there was a shock of recognition. Leona Durham was the editor of the 
University of Iowa's student newspaper, The Daily Iowan, when I was there as an 
undergraduate in the late 1960's and early 1970's. I remember her as a very outspoken 
person who was willing to take controversial stands. In my view her treatment by the 
Iowa State Bar Association has something of a bad odor to it. 
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one-year suspension from the practice of law to the Iowa 
Supreme Court. The ethics committee had recommended her 
suspension because she was seen kissing and embracing her 
client during her visits with him at the state penitentiary. 
There was no allegation that sexual intercourse took place 
and the disciplinary proceedings were not initiated because of 
dissatisfaction by Durham's client with her professional ser-
vices. The supreme court determined by "a clear preponderance 
of evidence" that Durham and her client "engaged in kissing 
and embracing during the visits in question, as well as at 
least occasionally caressing or fondling each other."70 (However, 
the court failed to similarly find that Durham had "exposed a 
breast for [her client's1 view. ")71 In light of these findings, the 
Iowa Supreme Court determined that a one year suspension 
was not merited; instead it publicly reprimanded Durham for 
her conduct. 
Durham's treatment by Iowa's ethics committee, a case 
which involved no client complaint, stands in sharp contrast to 
the treatment of male attorneys in California and Illinois. 
Neither the California bar's handling of the complaints against 
Marvin Mitchelson nor the Illinois bar's handling of the com-
plaints against the unnameable attorney sued by two different 
women in Suppressed and Doe has led to any discipline of these 
men for their alleged sexual exploitation of numerous female 
clients.72 Two reasons for this come to mind. First, Durham's 
conduct was public, while Mitchelson and Mr. Unnameable's 
conduct took place behind closed doors. Second, Durham's 
conduct was unladylike. The concept of a woman attorney pub-
licly expressing her physical attraction to a convicted criminal 
is disturbing. As the Durham court responded, "Sexual contact 
with a client in a professional context ... is well outside that 
which could be termed temperate and dignified. "73 
Accordingly, the court held that Durham violated the eth-
ical consideration calling upon a lawyer to be "temperate and 
70. Id. at 282. 
71. Id. 
72. The Iowa Supreme Court suspended a male attorney for six months for 
requesting sex in lieu of fees from a divorce client in Iowa State Bar v. Hill, No. 23· 
99·1695 (Iowa, Nov. 22, 1989). Quid pro quo would appear to be much more serious 
than failing to act in a dignified manner. See also Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Gibson, 124 Wis.2d 446, 473·4, 369 N.W.2d 695, 698-9 (1985) (court suspended attor· 
ney for ninety days for sexually assaulting client and refused to consider testimony 
of four former clients whom he had similarly sexually exploited). 
73. 279 N.W.2d at 284. 
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dignified." It also found that her behavior violated a disci-
plinary rule regarding conduct "that adversely reflects on his 
[or her] fitness to practice law."7. 
The openness of Durham's conduct was clearly an important 
factor: 
We are faced not with a question of private 
sexual conduct by an attorney, but with con-
duct by an attorney who was at least appear-
ing to function in her professional capacity. 
We are thus unable to accept [Durham's] 
argument that the incidents in question 
were solely of a private nature between con-
senting adults.76 
Notably, the Iowa Supreme Court specifically distinguish-
es the first In re Wood76 case on the grounds that the conduct 
in Wood was "private."77 (Wood was the attorney who received 
a one year suspension for his first proven offense of bartering 
sex for services, and who was later disbarred for his second 
proven offense involving similar conduct, this time with a 
minor whom he forced to act as a pornographic model).78 
Intriguingly, the only other case I have found where a 
woman attorney's personal relationship with her client caused 
a public outcry involved facts quite similar to those in Durham. 
Oregon attorney Karen Steele was assigned to represent crim-
inal defendant Frank Gable (who has since been convicted of 
murdering Oregon Corrections Director Michael Francke). 
Ms. Steele fell in love with Gable, and during her visits to him 
in jail was witnessed "cuddling, laughing and holding hands" 
with him. This made front page news in the Portland 
Oregonian newspaper.79 When her conduct reached the public's 
attention, her firm withdrew from its representation of Gable. 
Steele resigned from the firm and married Gable. Here, no one 
charged Steele with unethical conduct. However, her behav-
ior was viewed as being sufficiently scandalous to merit exten-
sive news coverage. 
74. ld. at 285. 
75. ld. 
76. 358 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 1976). 
77. 279 N.W.2d at 285. 
78. See supra note 8, and accompanying text. 
79. Portland Oregonian, July 11, 1991. 
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The double standards of society and of the Bar were hard 
at work in these two cases. Compared with the conduct of male 
attorneys who have sexualized their relationships with their 
clients, the conduct of Durham and Steele is trivial, and not 
even particularly newsworthy. 
The persistent discounting by the judiciary and the Bar of 
women clients' allegations of injury by the sexualization of the 
attorney-client relationship are consistent with the male myth 
of the "demon woman" seeking vengeance by destroying a 
man's career. This myth emerges wherever there are allegations 
and denials of sexual misconduct. As Professor Susan Estrich 
points out in her book Real Rape: "Three centuries ago the 
English Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale warned that rape is 
a charge "easily to be made and hard to be proved, and hard-
er to be defended by the party accused, tho' never so innocent."80 
The myth is that the woman, despite her demure appear-
ance, actually desires the man to force her to have sex with him. 
Presumably, after she has allowed herself to be seduced, her 
feelings of guilt cause her to cry ~rape" or, in this context, 
"breach of fiduciary duty". According to the myth the male is 
an innocent victim of these female wiles and neuroses.S l 
The truth, documented by numerous studies, is that the 
number of false. allegations by women of sexual injuries is 
incredibly small. A recent newspaper article on rapes in 
80. S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 5 (1987) (citing SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF 
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, I (1971). 
81. Men's fear of being falsely accused of sexual misconduct by obsessive and vin-
dictive women permeates our culture. See, e.g., 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 459, 460 (3d 
ed.1924): 
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of 
errant young girls and women coming before the courts in all 
sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, dis-
torted partly by inherent defects, partly by a diseased 
derangement or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social 
environment, partly by temporary physical or emotional 
conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of con-
triving false charges of sexual offenses by men. The unchaste 
(let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression 
in the narration ofimaginary sex - incidents of which the nar-
rator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the nar-
ration is straightforward and convincing. The real victim, 
however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the 
respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a 
wronged female helps give easy credit to such a plausible tale. 
See also S. Freud, Lecture 33, Femininity, cited in J. STRACHEY, THE COMPLETE 
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, 576 (1966). 
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Portland, Oregon said: "Portland police think the number of 
false reports [of rape] they receive is very small ... [I]n 1990 of 
the 431 rape and attempted rape reports made to the Portland 
police, 1.6% were determined to be unfounded. By comparison, 
2.6% of the stolen vehicle reports were false or unfounded.s2 
Similarly, Peter Rutter asserts that "[ w ]hile there do exist 
destructive women who try to coerce men into having sex or 
who falsely accuse men of sexual exploitation, this is still a 
miniscule problem compared to the actual abuse by men of for-
bidden-zone relationships. "S3 
Nevertheless, the legal system is obsessed with the per-
ceived danger of the false accusation. In Suppressed u. 
Suppresseds4 one reason given for refusing to allow an action 
against a divorce attorney by his client for the emotional harm 
she claimed resulted from her sexual relationship with him was 
that "[t]he potential for abuse would be too great."S6 The 
judges were concerned that imposing liability for such conduct 
would chill the attorney-client relationship because of the 
"grave potential" for such a suit "to be used for blackmail by 
unscrupulous persons seeking unjust enrichment. "S6 These 
"unscrupulous persons" are, of course, those vindictive and con-
niving women the myth describes. 
A similar concern was raised by the dissenting opinion in 
a case in which a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court 
allowed a malpractice action to go forward against an unli-
censed psychologist for having sex with his client. The dissent 
in Corgan u. MuelingS7 protested that "[t]o hold the defendant 
legally liable under such conditions is to countenance a legal 
form of extortion or blackmail." He concluded his opinion: 
82. Sunday Oregonian, Jan. 5, 1992, at A-11, cols. 1,2. 
83. P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 164. 
84. 206 Ill. App. 3d 918, 565 N.E.2d 101 (1990). 
85. 1d. at 923, 565 N.E.2d at 106. 
86. 1d. at 923 n.3, 565 N.E.2d at 106 n.3. What do courts fear when they suggest 
that liability for injuries arising out of attorney-client sex may "chill" the attorney-
client relationship? Are they concerned that an attorney will be deterred from coun-
seling clients? From holding their hands? The court in Barbara A. was also worried 
about this issue: "To hold otherwise would have a chilling and far reaching effect on 
any personal relationship between an attorney and his or her clients." 145 Cal. App. 
3d 369, 379,193 Cal. Rptr., 422, 432-3 (1983) (denying the usual presumption of undue 
influence because the case involved the attorney~client relationship). Why don't most 
courts have the same concern about the chilling effect of liability for psychotherapist-
patient sex? 
87. 574 N.E.2d 602, 611 (Ill. 1991). 
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"The plaintiff, having willingly engaged in a frolic, now seeks 
to use the legal system as a tool for a shakedown."88 
Joseph DuCanto, who practices family law and also teach-
es at law schools in Chicago, opposes a rule barring attorney-
client sex because such a rule "makes male lawyers extremely, 
extremely vulnerable to ugly kinds of charges that have little 
or no substance." He adds, "That's not to say every woman who 
complains her lawyer put his hand on her breast is to be dis-
believed. But believe me, there are a lot of wackos out there 
who will do anything to save a few bucks. "89 But why should 
we believe him, when the facts tell us the opposite? And why 
do so many people, both male and female, continue to believe 
that women who allege that they were sexually exploited 
behind closed doors are either liars or psychopaths?90 
Further evidence that the law views sex with one's client 
from a male perspective can be derived from those cases 
against psychotherapists who engage in sexual relations with 
their clients, where the person seeking recovery for injuries is 
not the woman client who had sex with her therapist but is 
instead her husband. The courts find that injuries to these hus-
bands are very real indeed. Breach of fiduciary obligations 
and/or professional malpractice are found if the husband was 
also a client of the therapist.91 And even if the husband was not 
a client, he can still claim intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 92 
Two nearly identical cases in Illinois suggest that the 
wrong the courts are willing to redress can be defined as 
88. Id. at 612. 
89. Gill & Holt, supra note 22, at 60. 
90. See Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, (Book 
Review), 41 STAN. L. REV. 751 (1989) (analyzing Catherine MacKinnon's feminist 
method that is based on "believing women's accounts of sexual use and abuse by men.· 
C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 5 (1987». As Professor Littleton points out, the 
concept of believing women's accounts about sexual abuse is a radical idea. The recent 
HilllThomas hearings and Smith (Kennedy) rape trial highlight the reality that 
women who allege that a powerful man sexually exploited her in private will rarely 
be believed. 
91. See, e.g., Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 
(1988); Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 585 A.2d 69 (Md. Ct. App. 1991); Anclote Manor 
Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So.2d 256 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Andrews v. United 
States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984). 
92. Spiess v. Johnson, 89 Or. App. 289, 294, affd memo by an equally divided court, 
307 Or. 242, 765 P.2d 811 (1988). 
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meddling with another man's property. In Horak v. Biris93 a 
husband sued a social worker for engaging in sexual relations 
with his wife during marital counseling. The Illinois appellate 
court found that the social worker breached his fiduciary duty, 
and that "any malpractice committed by the defendant in the 
treatment of plaintiff's wife [who was not a party to the suit] 
would clearly have an impact upon plaintiff as well. "94 The 
court allowed the cuckolded husband to recover damages for his 
emotional distress and even for loss of consortium. In contrast, 
an Illinois appellate court just three years earlier held that a 
woman could not recover for the emotional harm she suffered 
from her husband having sexual relations with his social 
worker during marital counseling. In her case, no breach of 
fiduciary duty was found. The Horak court acknowledged that 
the facts of Martino v. Family Service Agency of Adams County 96 
were virtually indistinguishable from those of Horak. The 
only distinction the Horak court found was that the plaintiff 
in Martino had not alleged "mishandling of transference" in her 
complaint.96 The judges in Horak failed to mention the more 
obvious difference between the cases: Horak involved a man's 
proprietary interest in his wife's sexuality while Martino did 
not. 
V. WOMEN ATTORNEYS WHO SUPPORT THE STATUS QUO 
While many women attorneys support the adoption of a rule 
banning attorney-clients, there are also many women attorneys 
who oppose such a rule. When the Oregon Board of Bar 
Governors brought a no-sex-with-clients rule to the member-
ship for a vote in October of 1991, some of the most outspoken 
opponents of the rule were women. For example, one woman 
said: 
I oppose this motion. I think it invades our 
right to privacy. The existing disciplinary 
rules and opinions take care of this. This 
new proposal is stricter than the [proposed] 
California rule, and it's totally unnecessary. 
Let's preserve our right to privacy. Our 
93. 130 Ill. App. 3d 140,474 N.E.2d 13 (1985). 
94. Id. at 145,474 N.E.2d at 18. 
95. 112 Ill. App. 3d 593, 445 N.E.2d 6 (1982). At least as ofl988, Martino was 
the only appellate case involving a female psychotherapist and her sexual relation-
ship with a male client. See LeBoeuf, supra note 3, at 84 n.7. 
96. 130 Ill. App. 3d at 145, 474 N.E.2d at 19. 
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current rules are sufficient. Let's leave it 
that way.97 
635 
One of the California Board of Bar Governors who opposed 
an outright ban on attorney/client sex was Catherine Sprinkles 
who was concerned that the bar's ethical rules not be "a mech-
anism for the State Bar to impose moral views on the public. "9S 
A female member of California Young Lawyers Association 
who commented on the proposed California rule was reported 
to have said that "many single lawyers would have to revert to 
celibacy if they couldn't consort with their clients, as long as 
it didn't affect their legal representation. "99 
What I hear these women say concerning attorney-client sex 
is that we need to protect the personal rights and needs of attor-
neys. What I don't hear them expressing is concern for the 
rights and interests of their clients. 
Considering the strong evidence that most people who suf-
fer serious injury from sex with their attorneys are women, why 
are so many women attorneys unwilling to endorse a rule to 
prevent their brother attorneys from harming other women? I 
would hope the reason is unawareness of the magnitude and 
extent of the harm caused by attorney-client sex. I fear, how-
ever, that also operating is a desire to protect their member-
ship in the "club." 
97. Transcript of 1991 Annual Business Meeting, Or. State B. Ass'n, Oct. 4, 1991, 
at 140 [hereinafter Transcript]. 
Another woman attorney also spoke out against the rule. She said: 
[d. at 154. 
I think it is an inappropriate recommendation. It's an intru-
sion into consenting adults doing something that is legal. It 
is not the same as a prohibition of taking your clients' prop-
erty .... It reminds me a little bit of the theology some years 
ago. Is this DR now the mortal sin, and we're going to put 
(inaudible) in the ethical considerations because it's not 
covered in it. I mean, look at the kind of intrusion we are 
making into private lives. I come from a fairly conservative 
theological history, but to me this is a throwback to Salem 
and the witch hunts and the puritan stock. And it is unac-
ceptable to interfere in people's private lives. 
98. The Recorder, Jan. 29,1991, at 3. Another woman attorney member of the 
California Board of Bar Governors, Claudia Carver, said, "any rule would be intrusive 
and' would pose constitutional questions.". [d. 
99. L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 2. She was also quoted as saying: 
"I work 12 hours a day, and I only meet lawyers and clients. And 1 wouldn't have sex 
with another lawyer, that's for sure: (She wouldn't have sex with other lawyers but 
it's fine for the clients to have sex with them?) 
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Catherine MacKinnon wrote a scathing attack titled "On 
Collaboration" against the women attorneys who opposed the 
ordinance proposed by her and Andrea Dworkin to make the 
sale of pornography actionable as sex discrimination. She 
made the following comment, which I find also applicable to the 
attorney-client sex issue: "It's even more frustrating to have 
women lawyers, feminists, say or act as though it doesn't hap-
pen - or if it does, that it is not as important as the pleasure to 
be gotten from it. "100 MacKinnon also said: 
To be a lawyer orients you to power, proba-
bly sexually as well as in every other way. 
The law has a historical hostility to new 
ideas, hurt women, and social change. But 
more than that, we were let into the pro-
fession on the implicit condition what we 
would enforce the real rules: women kept 
out and down, sexual access to women 
enforced ... It keeps the value of the most 
exceptional women high to keep other 
women out and down on their backs with 
their legs spread ... What law school does for 
you is this: it tells you that to become a 
lawyer means to forget your feelings, forget 
your community, most of all, if you are a 
woman, forget your experience. 101 
MacKinnon's message is controversial, but also very pow-
erful. Women attorneys should keep her message in mind as 
they consider their position on the issue of attorney-client 
sexual relationships.I02 
100. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 202 (1987). "On Collaboration" was 
based on a speech that was part of a debate at the National Conference of Women and 
the Law in New York, Mar. 24, 1985. 
101. ld. at 205. MacKinnon concluded: "I want you to stop claiming your liber-
alism, with its elitism, and your Freudianism, with its sexualized misogyny, has 
anything in common with feminism." ld. 
102. Opposition to an attorney-client ethical rule actually goes against the 
interests of many women attorneys. Young women associates in large firms are not 
infrequently propositioned by their male business clients. The power in these situ-
ations is actually wielded by the clients. The women associates are vulnerable 
because their firms do not want to alienate valuable clients. An ethical rule against 
attorney-client sex would be one reason these women could give their clients for 
refusing their sexual advances. 
This dilemma for women associates was discussed at a sexual harassment 
workshop which was part of a conference on Feminist Jurisprudence held at Lewis & 
Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon on April 19, 1991. Many of the women participating 
described problems with their business clients sexually pressuring them and 
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VI. WHY A RULE BANNING ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEX 
WOULD BENEFIT LAWYERS. 
Lawyers have a bad public image. A Gallup poll ranked 
attorneys just below funeral directors in public esteem. lOS A 
national survey by the Consumer Research Center reported 
that almost half those responding rated lawyers services and 
fees as poor, one of the study's lowest ratings. 104 
Lawyers' public refusal to regulate their personal behavior 
which may affect their professional behavior does nothing to 
improve the public's low regard. While conducting research for 
this paper I found a 1919 Oregon Supreme Court opinion in 
which Judge Bennett, in his dissent to the majority's failure to 
find a breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney (not involving sex-
ual conduct), spoke to both the issue of attorneys' obligations 
to the public and the low public esteem in which attorneys are 
held. The following, which Judge Bennett wrote in response to 
the majority's strong language about an attorney's obligations 
to his client, is perhaps even more on point today: 
These are brave, strong words, and with 
every syllable of them I entirely concur. 
They fix the duty of an attorney toward his 
client at a high standard - but not too high, 
when we consider the peculiarly confidential 
relation which an attorney enjoys; and the 
fact, that those with whom he deals ... are 
generally ignorant of the law, and of their 
legal rights; and practically at the mercy of 
the lawyer who represents them. Such a 
declaration of the principles which govern 
attorneys, will be an inspiration to the 
lawyer who cares deeply for his profession 
and for its honor. When it becomes general-
ly known, that this is the standard which 
governs the conduct of attorneys - and that 
the courts unflinchingly carry the princi-
ples so declared into execution - there will be 
the lack of support from their law firms for their predicament. Conversation with 
Professor Mary Wood, February 11, 1992 and telephone conversation with Professor 
Kristine Rogers, February 28, 1992. 
103. Rymer, High Road, Low Road: Legal Professicn at Crossroads, Trial 
Magazine, Oct. 1989, at 79. 
104. [d. 
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an end to that unjust belief, unfortunately 
now so general among laymen, that lawyers 
are mercenary and unscrupulous grafters; 
and that the courts, being composed of 
lawyers promoted, look with complacent tol-
erance, and winking eye, upon unjust greed 
and rapacity of their erstwhile associates. l06 
Judge Bennett's words reflect my beliefs about how lawyers 
are perceived and why they are perceived this way. I believe 
that the public in general and attorneys' clients in particular 
will view a refusal to adopt a rule on attorney-client sex as 
purely self-serving and self-protecting. l06 The fact that the 
California legislature enacted a statute mandating that such 
a rule be in effect by January of 1991, despite which the 
California Supreme Court still has not promulgated it, makes 
the legal profession look bad. Lawyers' protestations about pri-
vacy and association freedoms are downright embarrassing. An 
unidentified speaker in favor of the proposed rule against 
attorney-client sex at the Oregon Bar Convention said: "I 
would suggest to you that the arguments being made against 
this resolution would fool only a lawyer. It will not fool our 
clients. It will not fool the members of the public. It is fine to 
take the sex out of the business of providing legal services. "107 
The public's view oflawyers is based on actual experience, 
which I hope is positive, and what they see, read and hear about 
lawyers. The public watches "L.A. Law"108 and reads about 
Marvin Mitchelson. For the public, the conduct of Arnie 
Becker and Marvin Mitchelson is conduct that the bar associ-
ation condones. And it is hard to argue that this is not true. 
Although we do have rules that may be applied to lawyer-
client sex when such conduct creates a conflict ofinterestl09 or 
threatens competent representationllo, these rules are rarely 
105. Kirchoffv. Bertstein, 92 Or. 378, 413, 181 P. 746 (1919) (Bennett, J., dis-
senting). 
106. As Victor McCarthy, a public member of the California Board of Bar 
Governors said: "The Bar has a real opportunity to enhance its credibility with the 
public, and the Bar is sorely in need of that enhancement." The Recorder, Jan. 29, 1991, 
at 3. 
107. Transcript, supra note 97, at p. 136. 
108. "L.A. Law" broadcast a show on the ethics of attorney-client sex. In it Arnie 
Becker, the randy divorce lawyer, was publicly humiliated when he was pointedly 
grilled on whether his own behavior with women clients was ethical or not. L.A. Law 
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 30, 1992). 
109. CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310. 
110. 1d. 
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enforced in this setting. And far too many lawyers think the 
whole idea of restricting attorney-client sex is simply ajoke. ll1 
AI Martinez' article in the Los Angeles Times on March 28,1991 
described a conversation between two lawyers which he over-
heard in a courthouse elevator: "One of them was saying it was 
nobody's business who, as he put it, his "sexual co-habitant" 
was .... Lawyer No.2 replied that it wasn't so much whether 
they should have sex with clients, but whether they should 
charge them for the time it takes to achieve satisfaction."112 
Possibly this anecdote would be amusing if the writer's 
message did not contain an unpleasant truth about the way 
some lawyers think. The truth is, some lawyers not only have 
sex with their clients, but charge them sizeable fees for these 
"professional" services. The word for this practice is prosti-
tution. lls John of Barbara A. u. John G. fame may have been 
guilty of this. So may have Albert Brooks Friedman, if what 
his former client, Sherry Kantar, alleges in In re Marriage of 
Kantar114 is true. Ms. Kantar appealed the summary judgment 
in favor of Friedman's firm for $16,392.17 in attorneys' fees 
arising from Friedman's representation of her in her divorce 
proceedings. She objected to paying this sum partly because 
111. Melvin Belli claims attorney-client sex is the "lawyer's prerogative." State 
Bar Struggles With Ethics of Lawyer-Client Sex, S.F. Examiner, Aug. 4,1986 at A-4, 
col. 1. 
112. Martinez, Sex and Law, L.A. Times, Mar. 28, 1991, § B, at 2, col. 5. 
Martinez also described other attorney's reactions: 
An attorney I spoke with named Max winked and said any 
client who had sex with him would emerge not only with vast-
ly increased trust and reliance but also with awesome respect. 
A woman attorney, Beverly, suggests that lawyers be fur-
nished with a card they could hand a client before the sex act 
takes place. Such a card would contain wording similar to 
that in the Miranda Rule, which advises suspects of their 
right to remain silent, etc., In this case, it would be the 
right not to have sex with one's lawyer and warn of the 
potential for problems thereafter. 
Actually, Beverly's flippant suggestion is basically the rule in Oregon for divorce 
lawyers. See Or. Board of Governors, Formal Op. 1991-99, infra note 133 and accom-
panying text. 
113. An attorney was disciplined when he was on the receiving end of prostitu-
tion in exchange for his legal services in In re Howard, 297 Or. 174 (1984). His client 
had been arrested for prostitution. Howard received a public reprimand because 
"[iJn payment for Howard's legal fee he and the woman engaged in sexual conduct." 
Id. at 177. 
114. 581 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991). See also McDaniel v. Gile, 230 
Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991) (client cross-complained for sexual harass-
ment after her attorney sued for his fees). 
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"she and Friedman engaged in sexual relations at least 20 
times prior to the entry of the judgment of dissolution [and] 
legal fees were billed for time during which [Kantar] and 
Friedman engaged in sexual relations and for personal tele-
phone calls to her .... "116 The Illinois appellate court reversed the 
summary judgment, but dodged the attorney-client sex issue.1I6 
It is an embarrassment to the legal profession that an 
attorney would charge a client for his sexual services and go 
unpunished. It is downright mortifying that the Illinois 
Supreme Court appointed Friedman to the committee on char-
acter and fitness of the State Board of Law Examiners after this 
suit had been filed.117 The Attorney General of Oregon, Charles 
Crookham, speaking about the proposed rule against attorney-
client sex at the Oregon State Bar Convention (prior to being 
appointed attorney genera!), mentioned the suit against 
Friedman and his appointment by the Illinois Supreme Court 
as an example of our present sad state of affairs. This exam-
ple was not enough to persuade the attorney voters who 
nonetheless rejected the rule. However, it did evoke laughter 
from the attorney audience. liS 
Some attorneys argue that we already have too many rules. 
However, a rule against attorney-client sex will not cause a 
flood of complaints or baseless charges of ethical violations. 119 
As discussed earlier, false reports of sexual injuries are 
extremely rare. 120 Virtually the only people likely to raise 
these matters with the bar are women clients who actually were 
sexually exploited by their attorneys. And moreover, these 
claims will meet with the great difficulty of proving sexual rela-
tions occurred at all, if, as is likely, the attorney does not 
admit this.121 In California the standard the Bar must meet to 
115. Id. at 9. 
116. The court concluded: MThe issue whether the alleged sexual relationship 
breached the attorney's fiduciary duty also is not reached because the alleged attor-
ney fees' impropriety alone would be a sufficient reason, if proven, to vacate the 
judgment." Id. at 11. But see the concurrence discussed infra note 254. 
117. Gill & Holt, supra note 24, at 10. 
118. Transcript, supra note 97, at 141. 
119. Some critics will respond that this is just their point. The problem is not a 
serious one and can be adequately dealt with under the present rules. My response 
is that the bar's refusal to specifically acknowledge that this is a problem is wrong both 
morally and from a public perception perspective. The Bar should take a public 
stand on this issue because it's the right thing to do. The present more general 
rules do not adequately do this. 
120. See supra notes 80, 81 and accompanying text. 
121. Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 8, 14. 
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prove a sexual relationship existed is clear and convincing 
evidence of reasonable certainty.122 If the woman client can 
meet this heavy burden of proof, attorneys should be con-
cerned about her claim. Proven sexual predators should not be 
allowed to practice law. 
Another argument against a rule prohibiting attorney/client 
sex is that it will not be effective against the sexual predator. 
While it is true to a certain extent (it may not deter his sexu-
al conduct), he will be stopped from preying on his clients ifhe 
is disbarred from practice. Most importantly, a bright line rule 
will provide notice to attorneys who are not sexual predators 
but simply lack judgment or awareness of the harm that sex 
with their clients can cause. The rule will also provide an attor-
ney who feels he is being seduced with a sound reason to 
refuse his client's advances. 123 
When I told a professor friend of mine from another disci-
pline that I was writing about the ethics of attorney/client 
sex, her response was to say that everything lawyers do is 
unethical. When I mentioned this topic to one of my students, 
he responded that as an undergraduate he took a course in 
political science where half the semester was spent reaching 
the conclusion that the sole purpose of the American Bar 
Association Rules is public relations. That intelligent people 
hold these views about about lawyers deeply troubles me. But 
lawyers' refusal to even try to improve their public image 
bothers me more. A number of attorneys in Oregon are angry 
with the Board of Bar Governors for proposing a rule against 
attorney-client sex, complaining that when the rule was voted 
down, attorneys were made to look bad. As one person speak-
ing out against the rule said, it placed attorneys "in a damned 
if we do and damned if we don't position ... by the fact that the 
resolution has been submitted for our consideration. "124 The 
question remains: how would ethical lawyers have been 
damned by the public if they did adopt such a rule? 
122. The Recorder, Apr. 23, 1991, at 1. The Oregon Bar's burden of proof is sim-
ilarlyonerous. As the Oregon Supreme Court noted in In re Wolf, 312 Or. 655, 657 
(1992). MThe Bar has the burden of establishing ethical misconduct by clear and con· 
vincing evidence." 
123. This could prove particularly useful for women attorneys as a means offend· 
ing off amorous clients. See, e.g., Gill & Holt, supra note 22, at 59 (for examples of other 
techniques used by women attorneys). See also supra note 100. 
124. Transcript, supra note 89, at 149. 
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Many lawyers just don't "get it." This issue is not about 
their rights. It is about the rights and interests of their 
clients. 126 
In the end we return to what Judge Bennett said about 
lawyers and the public in 1919. If attorneys do adopt a rule pro-
hibiting attorney-client sex, "[w]hen it becomes generally 
known, that this is the standard that governs the conduct of 
attorneys - and that the courts unflinchingly carry the prin-
ciples so declared into execution - there will be an end of the 
unjust belief, ... that lawyers are mercenary and unscrupulous 
grafters. "126 
VI. THE OREGON AND CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES 
A. OREGON 
I will now briefly summarize the Oregon and California 
bars' treatment of the sex-with-clients controversy over the past 
few years. Oregon is especially interesting because it is the only 
state to ever attempt to voluntarily to restrict its members' con-
duct. Oregon continues to be the most progressive state on this 
issue, despite the defeat of a rule making attorney-client sex 
per se unethical in October 1991. 
Oregon's first attempt to specifically regulate attorney-
client sex was partly a reaction to the 1978 decision, Lehr 
and Lehr127 , discussed earlier. The Board of Governors 
addressed the problem of attorney-client sex in the divorce con-
text by issuing Legal Ethics Opinion No. 429 in 1979. In this 
opinion, the Board concluded it was per se unethical for an 
attorney to be sexually involved with a client if he was repre-
senting her in a divorce proceeding except "where there are no 
children and [there is] an amicable settlement, or a default pro-
ceeding."128 The basis for finding the conduct unethical was DR 
5-101(A) which requires that an attorney not represent a 
client if the exercise of his professional judgment might be 
125. When California State Bar President Charles B. Vogel said in the L.A 
Times (L.A. Times, Jan. 21, 1991, Section A, at 3, col. 5)"1 have not had one single 
lawyer call or write me about this issue-and if this were really an important prob· 
lem, 1 think we'd have had a lot of communications," 1 say to myself: he doesn't get it. 
126. Kirschoffv. Bernstein, 92 Or. 378, 413, 181 P. 746 (1919). 
127. 36 Or. App. 23, 583 P.2d 1157 (1978) (discussed supra notes 53·8 and 
accompanying text. 
128. Or. Board of Governors, Legal Ethics Op., 429, at 446 (withdrawn June, 
1982). 
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affected by his personal interest, unless the client consents after 
full disclosure. 129 
This opinion was quite radical for its time. However, the 
exception it granted to the per se rule caused a public outcry. 
For example, the National Law Journal commented, "The 
Oregon Bar Association has been taking a lot of heat for its ... 
ethics opinion that says it's OK for a lawyer to have sex with 
a client in certain instances.m3o 
Public pressure led the Board of Governors to withdraw No. 
429 and issue ethics opinion No. 475 on this issue in 1982. This 
opinion declared attorney-client sex in the divorce context to 
be a per se unethical in all cases. This remains the strongest 
position any bar association has taken on attorney-client sex. 
The opinion contains some very sensible language: 
The attorney-client relationship is a fidu-
ciary relationship, one of trust. The nature 
of that fiduciary relationship tends to make 
the client intellectually and, in many cases, 
emotionally dependent upon the attorney. 
If the client becomes involved in a love affair 
with the attorney, that dependency would 
only be increased. It would appear impossi-
ble for the lawyer to carryon such an affair 
with the client and maintain an indepen-
dent judgment about whether the affair 
might harm the client's interests .... Even if 
the attorney were able to predict the conse-
quences of the affair and explain them to 
the client, it is doubtful that the client's con-
sent to the attorney's continued represen-
tation could ever be deemed truly informed 
and voluntary (emphasis added).131 
This opinion recognizes and comes to terms with the prob-
lem of transference, at least in a divorce setting. It remains the 
national high water mark for restricting attorney-client sex-
ual relations. 132 
129. P. JARVIS, S. MOORE, J. SAPIRO, OREGON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ANNOTATED 75 (O.L.I. 1988). 
130. In Flux, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 2, 1982. 
131. Op. 475, supra note 21, at 510. 
132. I know of no Oregon case presented to the ethics committee that specifically 
would be covered by this advisory opinion. The only opinion concerning attorney-client 
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After Oregon Legal Ethics Opinion No. 475 was issued, 
public concern about attorney-client sex died down in Oregon 
as well as nationally. Only in the 1990's did the issue return 
to the forefront of national attention because of publicity about 
attorney sexual misconduct in Illinois and California. Ironically, 
in the process of reviewing its older ethical opinions, the 
Oregon Board of Governors replaced No. 475 with Formal 
Opinion No. 1991-99, which is somewhat weaker. The new 
opinion provides that an attorney may have sex with his client 
during divorce proceedings as long as the disclosure and con-
sent requirements of DR 5-101(A) are satisfied. This is close 
to a per se rule because full disclosure for DR 5-101 purposes 
requires both that the attorney recommend that the client 
"seek independent legal advice to determine if consent should 
be given" and that "[fJull disclosure shall be contemporaneously 
confirmed in writing. "133 The effect such disclosure would 
have would likely be to deter most sexual relationships. 
sex published during the period this opinion was in effect was In re Ofelt, 1 D.B. Rptr 
22 (1985) in which the Oregon Supreme Court ordered Ofelt to be suspended from prac-
tice for 60 days because ofa conflict of interest with one of his business clients, a mar-
ried couple, as a result of his having an affair with the wife. Ofelt admitted that his 
sexual relationship with the wife client affected his professional judgment. However 
in his answer to the complaint he claimed he was the one who was harmed: 
Id. at 40-41. 
The accused concedes that his judgment may have been 
impaired by his affair with Sally Johnson, but denies that the 
Johnsons were harmed by his actions. His efforts were 
undertaken to improve the Johnsons' business, at a time 
when they were struggling, and were done with their consent 
and encouragement. The affair placed a great amount of 
stress on the accused, but it did not cause him to do anything 
in connection with the business which was detrimental to the 
Johnsons' interest. If anything, the accused was influenced 
to enter into a business under terms that were unfavorable 
to himself. As a result the accused lost money, got sued, and 
has had to undergo counseling with a psychiatrist. 
The only other published opinion concerning attorney-client sex in Oregon was 
decided very recently and again did not involve a divorce attorney. See In re Wolf, 312 
Or. 655 (1992) (male personal injuries attorney had sexual intercourse with his 16-
year old female client). 
133. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 10-101(B) (1980). It 
would be entertaining to try to draft the written consent form that would be necessary 
for ethical attorney-client sex. 
DR 10-101(B) was modified slightly at the Oregon State Bar Convention on 
October 4, 1991. It now says: 
(B) (1) "Full disclosure" means an explanation sufficient to 
apprise the recipient of the potential adverse impact on the recip-
ient, of the matter to which the recipient is asked to consent. 
(2) As used in DR 5-101 ... "full disclosure" shall also include 
a recommendation that the recipient seek independent legal 
advice to determine if consent should be given and shall be 
contemporaneously confirmed in writing. 
34
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The change from No. 475 to No. 1991-99 was based on the 
advice of Portland attorney Peter Jarvis, an expert on legal 
ethics. l34 Some members of the Board of Governors wanted to 
retain an absolute per se opinion, but Jarvis advised them that 
Oregon's ethical rules in their present form would not support such 
an interpretation. A rule specifically restricting attorney-client 
sex would be necessary to support an opinion like No. 475.136 
In response to Jarvis' advice, the Board of Governors formed 
a subcommittee to examine the possibility of drafting a rule 
specifically addressing attorney-client sex. The Board unan-
imously endorsed a rule making all attorney-client sex a per se 
ethical violation except where the client was a spouse, a part-
ner in a preexisting sexual relationship, or a peripheral employ-
ee of a business-entity client.136 This proposed rule was debated 
A personal injuries attorney was recently found to have violated former DR 5-
101(A) where he had sexual intercourse with his 16-year old client. In II'!. re Wolf, 312 
Or. 655, 661 (1992), the Oregon Supreme Court held that even though sexual inter-
course did not occur until after a settlement agreement had been reached, an attor-
ney-client relationship continued because "the proceeds of the settlement had not been 
distributed." (After the case was settled for $200,000, the attorney and his client rode 
around town in a limousine, and had sexual intercourse in the back seat.) The court 
found that the attorney had a personal interest in the case, noting that "before the set-
tlement had been approved by the court, [the attorney] realized he had developed a 
strong sexual interest in the girl, and she in him." ld. The court also found that the 
exercise of the attorney's "professional judgment on his client's behalf reasonably might 
have been affected by his personal interest." Therefore, informed consent was required, 
and the court concluded that the client's consent to sexual intercourse "does not 
amount to informed consent to ... continuing representation." ld. 
134. Telephone interview with Peter Jarvis, Jan. 31, 1992. 
135. ld. 
136. Proposed rule DR 5-110 provided: 
(A) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a current 
client or representative of a current client. 
(B) This rule shall not apply where the sexual relations are 
between spouses or began prior to the establishment of the 
lawyer-client relationship and where the lawyer's profes-
sional judgment is not or reasonably will not be affected by 
the sexual relationship. 
(C) For purposes oftMs rule "sexual relations" means: 
(1) sexual intercourse; or 
(2) any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts 
of a person or causing such person to touch the sexual 
or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of 
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party. 
(D) For purposes of this rule "representative of a client" 
means a principal, an employee, an officer or a director of a 
client: 
(1) Who provides the client's lawyer with information 
that was acquired during the course of, or as a result 
of, such person's relationship with the client a.s prin-
cipal, employee, officer or director and is provided to the 
lawyer for the purpose of obtaining for the client the 
legal advice or other legal services of the lawyer; or 
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and voted on at the Business Meeting of the Oregon State 
Bar on October 4, 1991. Jeff Sapiro, the Oregon State Bar's dis-
ciplinary counsel, noted during the debate over the rule that 
there were approximately six complaints concerning attor-
ney-client sex currently under investigation by the Bar. He said 
that the existing rules were adequate in some cases, such as 
where criminal conduct had occurred. However, he noted that 
a specific rule was the best mechanism for dealing with attor-
ney-client sex.I37 Despite his testimony, and the unanimous 
endorsement of the Board of Governors, the rule was rejected 
by a margin of 139 to 107 attorney voters. 
One reason the rule failed to pass was that a number of 
attorneys thought it was too complicated and ambiguous. As 
a result, the present status of attorney-client sex in Oregon is 
that the general rules may be applied to appropriate cases but 
only in the divorce setting is there the specific guidance pro-
vided by Formal Opinion No. 1991-99, discussed earlier.I3s 
The Board of Governors may propose a different specific rule 
in the future, but no such action has been taken so far.I39 
The proposed rule and its rejection by the membership 
received widespread publicity. For example, the Portland 
Oregonian reported: "The debate over lawyer-client sex rela-
tionships was the sexiest and generated the most bad jokes at 
the bar convention, but as one lawyer lamented: 'We're doing 
all kinds of important things here but what gets all the atten-
tion is lawyers and sex."'140 Possibly that's because the public 
thinks that the issue of lawyers and sex is important. 
B. CALIFORNIA 
In contrast to the Oregon bar's self-initiated considera-
tion of the issue of attorney-client sex, the California bar has 
had the issue imposed upon it by the legislature. In 1989, in 
reaction to the widely publicized scandal involving divorce 
(2) Who as part of such person's relationship with the 
client as principal, employee, officer or director, seeks, 
receives or applies legal advice from the client's lawyer. 
137. Transcript, supra note 97, at 148. One attorney who opposed the proposed 
rule remarked: "I do represent my wife from time to time. We have a lot of dogs and 
cats in our bedroom. I'd rather not have JefTSapiro there too." Portland Oregonian, 
Oct. 5, 1991, § A, at 14. 
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
139. Se%-With-Client Ban Fails, A.B.A. J. Feb. 1992, at 24. 
140. Lawyer-client se% rule defeated, Portland Oregonian, Oct. 5, 1991, § A, at 14. 
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Marvin Mitchelson's alleged rapes of some of his clients, state 
assemblywoman Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-Los Angeles) began 
her successful campaign for the legislature to enact a statute 
mandating that the California Bar Association adopt an eth-
ical rule with the approval of the California Supreme Court that 
would specifically govern attorney-client sexual relations.141 On 
September 29,1989, this bill was signed by the Governor142 and 
became section 6106.8 of the California Business and 
Professions Code. It required that the Bar submit a rule to the 
Supreme Court "no later than January 1, 1991."143 
Despite this mandate, the Bar did not adopt its proposed 
rule until April 20, 1991 (by an 18-4 vote),144 The supreme 
court sent the rule back to the State Board of Bar Governors 
in late August of 1991 for the Board to obtain additional 
comments from attorneys and the public. 145 In a letter dated 
August 26, 1991 the court ordered the Bar to begin a 90-day 
public comment period, focusing on the paragraph in the 
proposed rule creating a presumption of ethical misconduct 
where attorney-client sex is proven. 148 At the end of the 90-
day period the Bar again forwarded their proposed rule to the 
supreme court along with the comments they received. 147 If 
the supreme court refuses to approve the rule, the California 
Legislature has a bill pending which will enact the proposed 
rule as a statute. 148 
Unlike the per se rule which Oregon attorneys rejected in 
October 1991, if an attorney-client sexual relationship is 
proven, the California rule creates only a rebuttable 
presumption of incompetent representation. 149 Placing the 
141. L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 1. 
142. B. Governors Memorandum, supra note 10, at 2. 
143. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106.8 (West 1989). 
144. L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 1. 
145. L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 1991, § A, at 3, col. 2. 
146. ld. 
147. Presentation by Henry Contreras, Chief Consultant to Assemblywoman 
Lucille Roybal-Allard, Feb. 8, 1992, Golden Gate University School of Law, San 
Francisco. 
148. The California Assembly has already approved it 73-0. ld. 
149. Proposed rule 3-120 states: 
(A) For purposes of this rule, "sexual relations" means sexu-
al intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another per-
son for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. 
(B) A member shall not: 
(1) Require or demand sexual relations with a client 
incident to or as a condition of any professional rep-
resentation; or 
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burden of proof on the attorney to rebut with a showing that 
he has competently represented his client is what appears to 
be bothering the California Supreme Court. ISO Why is this a 
problem? Does the court think lawyers need greater procedural 
protection than do psychotherapists when they have sex with 
their clients?161 It will be interesting to see what the court final-
ly does in reaction to the statutory mandate and Board of 
Governors' recommended rule. 
If nothing further transpires in California on the issue of 
attorney-client sex, the California bar is left with some 
limited guidance in the form of the Barbara A. v. John G.162 and 
McDaniel v. Gile163 decisions and Formal Ethics Opinion No. 
1987-92. 
Barbara A., discussed earlier,IM makes it clear that attor-
neys' fiduciary duty to their clients is not limited to dealings 
(2) Employ coercion, intimidation, or undue influ-
ence in entering into sexual relations with a client; or 
(3) Continue representation of a client with whom 
the member has sexual relations if such sexual rela-
tions cause the member to perform legal services 
incompetently in violation ofrule 3-110. 
(C) Paragraph (B) shall not apply to sexual relations between 
members and their spouses or to ongoing consensual lawyer-
client sexual relations which predate the initiation of the 
lawyer-client relationship. 
(D) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a 
client but does not participate in the representation of that 
client, the lawyers in the firm shall not be subject to disci-
pline under this rule solely because of the occurrence of 
such sexual relations. 
(E) A member who engages in sexual relations with his or 
her client will be presumed to violate rule 3- 120, paragraph 
(B)(3). This presumption shall only be used as a presump-
tion affecting the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings 
involving alleged violations of these rules. uPresumption 
affecting the burden of proof"' means that presumption 
defined in Evidence Code sections 605 and 606. 
150. Lawyer-Client Sex Ethics Rule Blocked by Court, L.A. Times, Aug. 28, 
1991, § A, at 3, col. 2. 
151. See CAL. CIV. CODE, section 726 (West 1988) which says: 
The commission of any act of sexual abuse, misconduct, or 
relations with a patient, client, or customer which is sub-
stantiallY related to the qualifications, functions, or duties 
of the occupation for which a license was issued constitutes 
unprofessional conduct and grounds for disciplinary action 
for any person licensed under this division .... 
152. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983). 
153. 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991). 
154. See discussion supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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with their clients' money. The court held that a breach of the 
attorney's fiduciary duty could be found where the attorney's 
sexual misconduct physically injured his client.166 McDaniel 
makes it clear that an attorney breaches his fiduciary duty to 
his client when, because of his sexual misconduct, he does 
not adequately represent his client's interests. In this case, 
attorney McDaniel sued his former client Gile for his legal fees. 
She cross-complained, alleging intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and legal malpractice caused by McDaniel's 
unwelcome sexual advances.16s Gile claimed that when she 
refused to have sex with McDaniel, he abandoned her case. She 
alleged that this caused her to suffer pecuniary harm when she 
settled her divorce case to her disadvantage. 167 She also alleged 
she suffered severe emotional distress from McDaniel's con-
duct. 15S The appellate court reversed the summary judgment in 
favor of McDaniel on Gile's claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and attorney malpractice. 169 Concerning 
the emotional distress claim, the court noted that a fiduciary 
relationship existed between McDaniel and Gile and that "[a] 
breach of fiduciary duty by an attorney is actionable whether 
it involves financial claims or physical damage resulting from 
the violation. "160 It noted that a special relationship existed and 
that McDaniel was aware that his client "was peculiarly sus-
ceptible to emotional distress because of her pending marital 
dissolution. "161 The court described McDaniel's conduct as 
"sexual harassment in the scope of the attorney-client rela-
tionship" and concluded that Barbara A. permitted such a 
claim.162 It concluded that "the facts of this case are no different 
than those alleging sexual harassment in the workplace. "lS3 
155. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 383, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422,436 (1983). 
156. 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 (1991). When Patricia Gile first 
met with attorney James McDaniel about her pending divorce McDaniel had her "fill 
out a lengthy and intimate self-characterization document, seeking intimate details 
of[her] personal and sexual life." [d. at 366. When he next met with Gile, McDaniel 
"continually referred ... back to the more intimate parts of [Gile's] personal life, par-
ticularly remarking about the sexual problems [she] had in [her] marriage." McDaniel 
on a different occasion "pinned [Gile] to the wall and kissed [her] on the mouth." [d. 
That same day he said to her: "I bet you are so frustrated right now, if 1 put you on 
top 1 bet you could last for hours." [d. McDaniel also called Gile at home and work 
and sexually harassed her. [d. 
157. [d. at 367, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 246. 
158. [d. 
159. Id. at 365, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 244. 
160. [d. at 368, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247. 
161. Id. 
162. [d. at 369, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 248. 
163. [d. 
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The court also allowed Gile to go forward on her legal mal-
practice claim based on her allegation that McDaniel 
abandoned her dissolution action when she refused to have sex 
with him. 164 The court concluded that McDaniel "not only 
delayed rendering legal services, but also withheld them and 
gave substandard services when [Gile] did not grant him sex-
ual favors. This conduct necessarily falls below the standard 
of care and skill of members of the legal profession."I66 However, 
the court refused to address the issue of whether attorney-client 
sex was a "per se violation of the fiduciary duty. "166 
McDaniel reaffirms the holding of Barbara A. concerning 
fiduciary obligations. It sends a clear message to lawyers 
who sexually exploit their clients that such conduct may be 
actionable ifit harms their clients' legal position. However, like 
Barbara A., McDaniel leaves unanswered the question of 
whether a client can recover against her attorney for breach of 
fiduciary duty and/or legal malpractice where her attorney's 
sexualization of the attorney-client relationship results in 
purely emotional distress. The ability of a client to recover in 
that situation is discussed in part VIn of this paper. 
Turning to the ethical implications of attorney-client sex, 
Opinion No. 1987-92 specifically addressed these issues. In a 
digest of its conclusions the opinion stated: 
No California Rule of Professional Conduct 
expressly prohibits a lawyer from having a 
sexual relationship with a client. However, 
such conduct could in some circumstances 
give rise to a violation of rules 6-101 (now 3-
110 Failing to Act Competently) or 5-102 
(now 3- 310 Avoiding the Representation of 
Adverse Interests). In addition, such conduct 
might present a question as to the client's 
ability to consent to a sexual relationship 
and also could detrimentally impact on the 
client's ability to render independent judg-
ments in the professional relationship.167 
This advisory opinion concludes by stating that attorney-
client sex would not per se violate existing ethical rules: 
164. 1d. at 370, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 249. 
165. 1d. 
166. 1d. 
167. Op. 1987-92, infra note 55, at 33 n.8. 
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The Committee seeks to respect the divi-
sion, however unclear, between the private 
and professional lives of lawyers. A per se 
ban on any sexual relationship with a client 
appears overly broad and unnecessary. On 
the other hand, the opinion reflects ... the 
many perils of a sexual relationship between 
lawyer and client. l68 
In other words, sometimes attorney-client sex is unethical 
and other times it is not. It will be difficult to know when that 
line is crossed except in the most egregious cases. 
In summary, California attorneys have been given serious 
warning signals concerning attorney-client sex by both case law 
and their own regulatory system. Nevertheless, untilliabili-
ty is imposed in cases where the harm is purely emotional, and 
a per se ethical rule against attorney-client sex is adopted, 
clients will continue to be sexually exploited to the detriment 
of those clients, the Bar, and society. 
VII. ETHICAL RULE PROPOSAL 
I propose that all jurisdictions adopt a clear per se ethical 
rule against most attorney-client sex. Without such a rule, 
those responsible for enforcement and the attorneys them-
selves will continue to be uncertain about when attorney-
client sex is unethical. A clear rule would give both attorneys 
and their clients appropriate notice that in most situations sex-
ualization of the attorney-client relationship is unethical. It 
would also be strong evidence for the public that attorneys take 
peer regulation seriously. It would show the public that the Bar 
is willing to regulate attorneys' personal conduct when it 
affects their professional relationships and discipline those 
attorneys who seek personal gratification at the expense of 
their clients' well-being. 
The rule I propose is not my own creation. It originated 
with Portland attorney and ethics expert Peter Jarvis. He was 
inspired to draft this rule by his experience at the meeting in 
October 1991 when Oregon lawyers rejected the attorney-
client sex rule proposed to them by the Board of Governors. At 
the Convention he spoke out against the Bar's proposed rule 
168. [d. at 42. 
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because he felt the existing ethics opinion adequately covered 
the issue. 169 However, he was sufficiently impressed by the nar-
row margin by which the rule failed to pass (139 to 107) to 
decide that Oregon attorneys would support the adoption of a 
well- drafted rule against attorney-client sex. 170 His proposed 
rule would read as follows: 
(A) A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a cur-
rent client of the lawyer if the sexual relations would, 
or would likely, damage or prejudice the client. 
(B) A lawyer shall not expressly or impliedly condition 
the performance of legal services for a current or 
prospective client upon the client's willingness to 
engage in sexual relations with the lawyer. 
(C) In all other circumstances, a lawyer may have sex-
ual relations with a current client only if (1) the 
sexual relationship began prior to the attorney-client 
relationship, (2) the lawyer and client are married or 
are in an equivalent domestic relationship, or (3) 
prior to the beginning of the sexual relationship, 
the client consents after full disclosure. 
(D) "Full disclosure" shall mean an explanation sufficient 
to apprise the recipient of the potential adverse 
impact on the recipient that a sexual relationship 
may cause. Full disclosure shall also include a rec-
ommendation that the client seek independent legal 
advice to determine if consent should be given. Full 
disclosure shall be contemporaneously confirmed in 
writing. 
(E) "Sexual relations" shall mean (1) sexual intercourse; 
or (2) any touching of the sexual or other intimate 
parts of a person or causing such person to touch the 
sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the pur-
pose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of 
either party.l7l 
169. Transcript, supra note 97, at 137-8. 
170. Telephone interview with Peter Jarvis (Jan. 31, 1992). 
171. Lawyers are creative creatures. This definition would even cover the sit-
uation where a lawyer calls his client and masturbates while talking to her. One of 
my attorney friends told me that another lawyer recently subjected his client to this 
behavior only a few days prior her hearing on the dissolution of her marriage. 
Interview with Eugene attorney Suzanne Chanti (Feb. 4, 1992). 
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(F) Where the lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with 
a client, the other lawyers in the firm shall not be 
subject to discipline solely because of the occurrence 
of such sexual relations. 172 
653 
This rule is preferable to the proposed Oregon rule because 
it is clearer and simpler and explicitly sets out the requirements 
for full disclosure.173 It is preferable to the proposed California 
rule for these same reasons and more. 174 
Unlike the California rule, it does not create a rebuttable 
presumption. The California Board of Governors Sex-with-
Client Subcommittee concluded that a per se rule "would be 
struck down as unconstitutional upon judicial challenge" on 
both right of privacy and freedom of association grounds. 176 If 
indeed there are any constitutional issues presented by a per 
se rule (which is doubtful), these are alleviated by the per-
missive nature of the Jarvis rule, which excepts conduct to 
which the client gives informed written consent. 
Another improvement of the Jarvis rule over the California 
rule is that the situations where sexual relations are com-
pletely prohibited by the Jarvis rule also apply to spouses 
and preexisting sexual relationships. Considering the highly 
unethical nature of the conduct set out in (A) and (B), no 
exceptions to the rule's application should be provided as there 
are in the California rule. 176 
172. This is not part of Jarvis' draft rule; I borrowed this from the proposed ILL. 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.17. The proposed Illinois rule states in full: 
(a) A lawyer shall not, during the representation of a client, 
engage in sexual relations with the client if: 
(i) The sexual relations is the result of duress, intim-
idation, or undue influence by the lawyer; or 
(ii) The lawyer knows or reasonably should know that 
the client's ability to decide whether to commence 
sexual relations is impaired by the client's emotional 
or financial dependency, or some other reason. 
(b) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a 
client, the other lawyers in the firm shall not be subject to dis-
cipline solely because of the occurrence of such sexual relations. 
Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 45. 
173. See proposed DR-510, supra note 136. 
174. See proposed rule 3-120, supra note 149. 
175. B. Governors Memorandum, supra note 10, at 8, 10. 
176. See Paragraph (C), supra text at 66, which says that the prohibitions in 
Paragraph (B) do not apply "to sexual relations between members and their spouses 
or to ongoing consensual sexual relationships which predate the initiation of the 
lawyer-client relationship." My response to this exception is why should it be ethical 
for an attorney to coerce or intimidate his wife into having sex with him during the 
time in which he is acting as her attorney? It reminds me of the marital rape excep-
tion to the crime of rape that has only recently begun to be rejected. 
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My endorsement of the Jarvis rule is tempered by my con-
cerns as to whether there are ever situations where a client who 
had no preexisting sexual relationship with her attorney can 
give genuinely informed consent to sexual relations within 
the professional relationship. According to Psychiatrist Peter 
Rutter, there are not.177 An attorney friend of mine agrees, 
arguing that it is simply not possible for a layperson to suffi-
ciently understand the risks to her interests that sexualization 
of her attorney-client relationship creates.178 
However, I ultimately favor the informed consent exception 
because there are some (although very few) clients and attor-
neys capable of keeping the two relationships separate. 
Moreover, it will be a very extraordinary case where the attor-
ney will want to have sex with his client badly enough to 
obtain informed written consent. If such "consent" was 
obtained, the client would then have written evidence of her 
attorney's intentions, which could later be evidence proving that 
sexual relations took place. If the client brought a complaint 
or lawsuit against her attorney based on their sexual relations, 
the attorney would have to produce this full disclosure docu-
ment in order to prove he acted ethically. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is likely that most lawyers would opt to refrain 
from having sex with their clients. 
I recommend one final constraint on the Jarvis rule. To 
empower the victim, I would limit the ability to allege violation 
of this rule to the client only so long as she is a competent adult 
and the conduct has no financial impact on anyone else. 179 It is 
not appr~priate for the Bar on its own, or, a third party such 
as the client's cuckolded husband,18o to have the ability to ini-
tiate disciplinary action against the attorney where sexual 
relations are the basis of the complaint. Considering the per-
sonal costs to the client of revealing this information, it should 
be her choice whether to subject herself to that process. 
177. P. RUTTER, supra note 5, at 28-9. 
178. Interview with Eugene attorney Suzanne Chanti (Feb. 4, 1992). 
179. I borrow this idea from Professor Frances Olsen's proposal regarding who 
should be able to bring a statutory rape complaint. See Statutory Rape: A Feminist 
Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV. 387, 408 (1984). She suggests that only 
underage women themselves should have the power to characterize their "sexual 
encounter as voluntary intercourse or as rape." [d. Similarly, I propose that the client 
should be the only person with the power to characterize her sexual relationship with 
her attorney as consensual or unethical. 
180. Cf. my discussion of husbands who seek to recover for their injuries result-
ing from sexual relations between their wives and psychotherapists, supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
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VIII. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEX 
Whether or not the Bar adopts a new ethical rule concern-
ing attorney-client sex, civil liability for harm to the client that 
results from sexual relations with her attorney should be 
allowed. I will examine the potential for civil liability under 
California law, making reference to other states where useful. 
I will limit my examination to suits for physical injury result-
ing from sexual intercourse, and suits for purely emotional and 
dignitary injuries based upon professional malpractice, breach 
of fiduciary duty, breach of ethical rules, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 
California is the only state in the nation with case law 
that expressly allows the recovery of money damages in some 
situations where injury to a client results from sexual exploita-
tion by her attorney.181 In 1983 the court of appeals decided 
Barbara A. u. John 0. 182 Barbara A. held that an attorney's 
client stated causes of action for both battery and deceit where 
she alleged that, based on her attorney's misrepresentation 
regarding his ability to impregnate her, she consented to sex-
ual intercourse with him which resulted in an ectoptic preg-
nancy from which she nearly died. In 1991 the court of appeals 
decided McDaniel u. Gile. 183 McDaniel held that an attorney's 
sexual harassment of his client which led to his abandoning her 
case when she refused his advances could be the basis for 
both an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and attorney malpractice. 
Even absent these decisions, if a client could prove that her 
attorney's sexual conduct physically injured her as a result of 
an intentional tort such as battery or rape, she could recover 
against her attorney just as any other party could for such 
intentional conduct. Importantly, the Barbara A. court said 
that, at least where the client alleges physical injury resulting 
from a sexual relationship with her attorney, the fact of the 
attorney-client relationship may aid her in proving her case. 
The court stated that the "lawyer-client relationship affects the 
proof of[the client's] cause of action at trial."184 
181. Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 104 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 
1990). 
182. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983) discussed supra notes 11, 
15 and accompanying text. 
183. 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991) discussed supra notes 156· 
66 and accompanying text. 
184. Barbara A at 378, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 431. 
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The court's reason for allowing the attorney-client rela-
tionship to affect the client's burden of proof is that the rela-
tionship is a fiduciary one. 1M The court describes a fiduciary 
relationship as follows: 
The essence of a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship is that the parties do not deal on 
equal terms, because the person in whom 
trust and confidence is reposed and who 
accepts that trust and confidence is in a 
superior position to exert unique influence 
over the dependent party.lS8 
Ordinarily, where a fiduciary relationship exists there is a 
presumption that the fiduciary exerted undue influence over 
his client which he has the burden of rebutting. Apparently 
this would be true for an attorney if the breach of his fiducia-
ry obligation involved the client's financial or other nonsexu-
al interest. ls7 
However, the Barbara A. court declares that although the 
fiduciary duty rule applies where physical injury results from 
attorney-client relationship, undue influence should not be 
presumed as a matter oflaw where sexual intercourse caused 
the injury. In this circumstance, to establish undue influence 
the client must instead prove that a confidential relationship 
existed. If the client provides sufficent evidence of such a 
relationship, then the burden of proving that her participation 
was consensual would shift to her attorney. For example, in 
Barbara A. the court says that if the client establishes the exis-
tence of a confidential relationship, her attorney "would then 
have the burden of proving that consent was informed and 
freely given in the battery cause of action, or, in the alterna-
tive, that her reliance was unjustified in the misrepresentation 
185. [d. The court says: 
We can find no valid reason to restrict these principles (con-
cerning an attorney's fiduciary relationship) to actions involv-
ing financial claims of a client and not to apply them to 
actions with which the client alleges physical injury result-
ing from a violation ofthe attorney's fiduciary obligation. 
186. [d. at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
187. [d. Other cases involving breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty to their client 
do not assert that the existence of the fiduciary duty in itself creates a presumption 
of undue influence. Instead they examine whether the attorney breached his duty with 
no mention of this being presumed. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 
281 Cal. Rptr. 242, 248 (1991); David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 
339,341-2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988); Tri-Growth v. Silldorf, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330, 
335-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989). 
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cause of action. "188 If, however, the client's tort action against 
her attorney was for a physical injury such as rape, it would 
seem that her showing of a confidential relationship would cre-
ate a presumption that sexual intercourse was not consensu-
al. This procedural difference could dramatically affect the 
client's ability to prove that the sex was non-consensual.18S 
The reason the Barbara A. court gave for applying a dif-
ferent standard in a case where the attorney physically injured 
his client through sexual relations was that the parties had a 
social as well as a professional relationship. ISO The court 
described what happened to Barbara A. as "unique" since at the 
time of the alleged sexual encounters Barbara A. consented. It 
was the attorney's misrepresention about his inability to 
impregnate her that converted her cause of action into one for 
an intentional tort. If she had alleged he forcibly raped her, or, 
as was alleged in McDaniel, he sexually harassed her, the 
court may not have treated this case as involving both a per-
sonal and professional relationship and been willing to presume 
lack of consent based on the fiduciary relationship without sep-
arate proof of a confidential relationship. 
In summary, based on Barbara A., it appears that the rule 
in California is that where physical injury from attorney-
client sex is alleged, proof by the client of a confidential rela-
tionship will shift the burden to the attorney to prove client 
consent. Where there was no social relationship between the 
parties, this requirement of proof of confidential relationship 
may not apply. Thus, the client in McDaniel, who alleged her 
attorney made unwelcome sexual advances, could assert a 
presumption of nonconsent and undue influence hased on the 
attorney-client fiduciary relationship.191 
Barbara A. also alleged that her attorney breached his 
ethical obligations by having sex with her.l92 The court declined 
to decide this issue because the state bar had not yet publicly 
188. 145 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
189. I have difficulty understanding the Barbara A court's assertion that the fidu-
ciary duty covers both financial and physical interests while at the same time it 
says a confidential relationship has to be proven in order to recover for injuries to phys-
ical interests resulting from sexual intercourse. Are fiduciary and confidential being 
used interchangeably? Or is "the highest fiduciary standardw one that presumes a con-
fidential relationship while just a fiduciary duty does not? 
190. 145 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 432. 
191. See McDaniel, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247. 
192. Barbara A 145 Cal. App. 3d at 380, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 433. 
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addressed it. Since then, ethical concerns over attorney-client 
sex have been discussed in detail in Formal Opinion No. 1987-
92. Even without the explicit rule presently being consid-
ered by the Bar and the California Supreme Court, Formal 
Opinion No. 1987-92 changes the legal landscape from that 
which existed at the time Barbara A. was decided. If a suit 
alleging physical injury from attorney-client sex was brought 
today, it could be appropriate to allege that rules 3-110 (regard-
ing the ability to act competently)193 and 3-310 (regarding con-
flict of interest)194 were violated and/or transference occurred 
that rendered the client unable to meaningfully consent to sex-
ual intercourse. 195 Then, if the plaintiff's allegations were 
proved, it would be appropriate for the court to use them "to 
define the duty component of the fiduciary duty which the 
attorney owes to his or her client. "196 
Barbara A. only addressed the situation where, as a result 
of attorney-client sex, the client suffered physical harm. 19? In 
most cases where attorney-client sex injures the client the 
harm will be emotional and dignitary instead. The only case 
in the nation to specifically address tort liability for purely emo-
tional harm is the 1990 Illinois appellate decision, Suppressed 
u. Suppressed. 19B 
Suppressed was an appeal from dismissal of the action 
because the trial court determined the two-year personal 
193. Op. No. 1987-92, supra note 61, at 34. 
194. 1d. at 37 (5-102 is now 3-310). 
195. 1d. at 40 n.8 (stating: 
The possibility that a client may transfer the confidence 
derived from the professional relationship to the sexual 
relationship should cause a lawyer to question the client's 
ability to consent to the sexual relationship. The cause for 
concern may be greater in those cases where the lawyer has 
initiated or suggested the idea of having the sexual rela-
tionship. If the sexual relationship has been initiated while 
the professional relationship is on-going, there may be an 
element of undue influence in obtaining the client's con-
sent. Would the client's consent be truly voluntary, or would 
it be based on the fear of retaliation that the lawyer may 
withdraw from the case or may compromise his or her efforts 
because he or she is angry with the client for refusing?). 
196. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1st Dist. 1988). 
197. The other relevant California case, McDaniel, involved emotional distress 
but the pecuniary harm was also alleged and the basis for the suit was the injuries 
resulting from the client's refusal to have sex with her attorney. 
198. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990). Doe v. Roe, 756 F.Supp. 353 
(N.D. Ill. 1991) is not a tort action. Instead the client brought a civil RICO action 
against her attorney (the same attorney as in Suppressed). 
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injuries statute oflimitation had run. The plaintiff argued that 
the five-year statute of limitation applicable to legal mal-
practice applied. The appellate court specifically addressed the 
question of whether attorney-client sex that causes purely 
emotional and dignitary harm is recognizable as legal mal-
practice. The court held it was not for two reasons: (1) the duty 
of care allegedly breached by the defendant is not one that aris-
es from the attorney-client relationship, and (2) no actual 
damages were alleged. 199 
Jeanne Metzger, the plaintiff in Suppressed, alleged that 
her attorney "locked his [office] door and then unzipped his 
pants. He then requested that plaintiff have oral sex with 
him. "200 She complied with his request and on two later occa-
sions complied with his requests to have sexual intercourse 
with her. She alleges that these sexual encounters were the 
result of psychological coercion and breached her attorney's 
fiduciary duty to her.201 
In holding that this conduct did not implicate the attorney-
client fiduciary duty the court said such a duty would only apply 
to attorney-client sexual relations where "there is tangible 
evidence that the attorney actually made his professional ser-
vices contingent upon the sexual involvement or that his legal 
representation of the client was, in fact, adversely affected."202 
The court distinguished an attorney's fiduciary relationship 
from that of a psychoanalyst on the grounds that the latter rela-
tionship involves transference while the former does not. 
Furthermore, the court viewed sexual relations with a client 
even where initiated by the attorney in a coercive setting to be 
"errors in judgment" rather than a failure "to exercise a rea-
sonable degree of care and skill".203 The Suppressed court 
noted that "[a]n attorney, just like the client, is at best and at 
worst, a human being fraught with all the frailties that the sta-
tus entails."204 
Based on the holding of Suppressed, this court would not 
have allowed the attorney-client relationship in Barbara A. to 
199. 565 N.E.2d at 104. 
200. [d. at 105. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for Jeanne Metzger's 
account of this incident. 
201. See supra note 63 and accompanying text for description of how Jeanne 
Metzger felt. 
202. 565 N.E.2d at 105. 
203. [d. at 105. 
204. [d. 
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have affected the result of the case in any way, since no alle-
gations of quid pro quo or poor legal results were made. 
The Suppressed court also concluded that "no actual dam-
ages were alleged" since the only injuries Jean Metzger claimed 
were purely emotional. 206 Thus the court held that even if the 
fiduciary duty had been breached, no liability would have 
been allowed. Therefore, even if Jeanne Metzger had been able 
to prove that her attorney had made performance of his legal ser-
vices expressly contingent on having sex with him, unless this 
had caused either financial or physical injury to her, no recov-
ery would have been allowed. 206 
How would Jeanne Metzger's case have been decided in 
California? I will outline four different grounds for tort liability 
for a client seeking to recover against her attorney for purely 
emotional harm caused by attorney-client sex: 1) attorney 
malpractice, 2) breach of fiduciary duty, 3) violation of ethical 
rules or guidelines contained in formal opinions, and (4) inten-
tional infection of emotional distress. 
First, the client could allege attorney malpractice. The ele-
ments of a cause of action for attorney malpractice are: 
(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill, 
prudence, and diligence as other members of 
the profession commonly possess and exer-
cise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proxi-
mate causal connection between the 
negligent conduct and the resulting injury; 
and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from 
the professional's negligence. 207 
As noted in Day v. Rosenthal208 : An attorney's duty, the 
breach of which amounts to negligence, is not limited to his fail-
ure to use the skill required of lawyers. Rather, it is a wider 
205. [d. 
206. If the McDaniel facts had been before the Illinois court, it might have 
allowed the case to proceed, since the attorney was seeking quid pro quo and had aban-
doned the case to his client's pecuniary detriment when she refused to submit to his 
sexual advances. See McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242, (1991) 
discussed supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
207. Garris v. Severson, 252 Cal. Rptr. 204, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988)..See 
also Budd v. Nixon, 491 P.2d 433 (1971); McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 
Cal. Rptr. 242, 249 (1991). 
208. 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985). 
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obligation to exercise due care to protect a client's best inter-
ests in all ethical ways and in all circumstances.209 
Without question, a client's best interests, including her 
interest in mental tranquility, are adversely affected by attor-
ney-client sex of the kind alleged by Jeanne Metzger in 
Suppressed. The client expects to be able to trust her attorney; 
a betrayal of that trust through conduct such as that alleged 
in Suppressed can devastate an already vulnerable client. If 
initiation of sexual relations with a client in the manner 
employed by the attorney in Suppressed fell below the standard 
of conduct to which members of the bar should adhere, then a 
breach of the attorney's duty could be found. 
Such conduct could clearly be the proximate cause of emo-
tional distress. That is, emotional distress would be a rea-
sonable and foreseeable consequence of the attorney's 
negligence. 
The final hurdle in a legal malpractice action is the element 
of damages. Recently, a number of California cases have 
allowed recovery for damages based on negligent infliction of 
emotional distress against attorneys by their clients. The 
three leading cases are Betts v. Allstate Ins. CO.210 decided in 
1984; Holliday v. Jones 211 decided in 1989; and Tara Motors v. 
Superior Ct. (Jasper)212 decided in 1990. In these cases the 
client was also able to show either economic damages or inter-
ference with the client's liberty interest. 
If a client alleging emotional distress from attorney-client 
sex could also show that her financial interests were adverse-
ly affected, the right to recovery seems quite certain based on 
the established caselaw. McDaniel v. Gile is directly on point 
209. ld. at 102. The Day court also said: 
[I]t is an attorney's duty to "protect his client in every pos-
sible way," and it is a violation of that duty for an attorney 
to "assume a position adverse to or antagonistic to his client 
without the latter's free and intelligent consent given after 
full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances. 
ld. at 99-100. Certainly, as California Legal Ethics Opinion 1987-92 notes, there are 
many instances where attorney-client sexual relations would adversely affect the 
client's interests without the client being fully cognizant of this. One of the interests 
that could be adversely affected is the clients mental peace of mind ifshe feared retal-
iation if she did not submit to her attorney's advances. See Op. 1987-92, supra note 
at 40. 
210. 201 Cal. Rptr. 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984). 
211. 264 Cal.Rptr. 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989). 
212. 276 Cal. Rptr. 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990). 
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and there the court allowed an action for attorney malprac-
tice.213 If, however, as in Jeanne Metzger's case, no financial 
harm was alleged, unless she could prove that her liberty 
interest was somehow affected, recovery would be an open 
question. As the Tara court stated: "We leave for another day 
attorney malpractice cases which do not involve such eco-
nomic losses or the interests discussed in Holliday."214The 
rationales for allowing emotional distress injuries in the pre-
viously decided attorney malpractice cases apply equally to 
those attorney-client sex cases where a breach of the attorney's 
duty of care has caused emotional distress. The court in 
Holliday v. Jones, explaining why attorneys must be held to 
high standards similar to those for other professionals, said 
that "a special rule benefitting only negligent lawyers" would 
be detrimental to both the public and the profession. The 
court continued: "In our view, not only is such a special inter-
est rule unfair, but public perceptions regarding it poorly 
serve the broader interests of the legal profession."216 The 
Holliday court reasoned that if a patient proved an improper 
psychiatic diagnosis had caused her mistaken committment, 
the California Supreme Court case of Molien v.Kaiser 
Foundation Hospitals 216 would clearly allow recovery for emo-
tional harm against the negligent psychiatrist. It therefore 
found that it was appropriate to allow recovery for emotional 
distress where defendant attorney's negligent representation 
of his client resulted in his client being convicted of murder and 
imprisoned. 
The Holliday court's analogy to other professions is also 
appropriate in cases involving attorney-client sex. In 
California, a psychiatrist's patient can recover for emotional 
distress against the psychiatrist because the psychiatrist 
engaged in sexual relations with the patient's wife.217 The 
213. The McDaniel court made it clear that this was malpractice. It said: 
The facts before this court show that [McDaniel] not only 
delayed rendering legal services, but also withheld them 
and gave substandard services when [Gile] did not grant him 
sexual favors. This conduct necessarily falls below the stan-
dard of care and skill of members of the legal profession. Id. 
at 370. 
214. 276 Cal. Rptr. at 669 n.7. 
215. 264 Cal. Rptr. at 455. 
216. 616 P.2d 813 (1980) (noting that a complaint alleging that defendant doc-
tor had negligently concluded that plaintiff's wife had syphilis, had instructed the wife 
to advise plaintiff of the diagnosis, and had required plaintiff to submit to a blood test 
adequately stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.). 
217. Richard H. v. Larry D., M.D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988). 
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basis for recovery in such a medical malpractice actions is 
"liability for breach of [] professional and fiduciary responsi-
bilities."2lB A psychiatrist who has sex with his patient should 
also be held liable for any emotional distress damages the 
patient herself suffers. 219 An attorney should not be treated dif-
ferently when he causes the same kind of harm to his client by 
engaging in the same conduct. 
The California Supreme Court recently narrowed the 
grounds of recovery for negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress in a bystander case, Thing v. La Chusa. 22o Nevertheless, 
it is still appropriate to allow recovery for direct emotional dis-
tress in cases like Jeanne Metzger's. Furthermore, attorney 
liability is already circumscribed by the general limitation of 
recovery to clients only and the harm alleged must be direct-
ly caused by the attorney-client relationship.221 
In summary, although there are no cases directly on point, 
there is a strong argument based on analogous cases that a 
client who alleges emotional harm from an attorney-client 
sexual relationship will, in some instances, be able to recover 
on the grounds of attorney malpractice. 
A related equitable claim can also be made based on breach 
of the attorney's fiduciary relationship to his client. Barbara 
A. could be extended to purely emotional harm based on the 
Bar's Ethical Opinion No. 1987-92 referring to the various 
ethical problems with many attorney-client sexual relation-
ships. Where the breach of fiduciary duty has resulted in 
economic injury, the courts have expressly based a finding of 
breach on the relevant ethical rules. For example, in David 
Welch Co. v. Erskine & TuUey222 the court held that defendant 
attorney breached his fiduciary duty to his former client by vio-
lating rules 4-101 and 5-101 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. The court noted that "these rules, together with 
the statutes and general principles relating to other fiduciary 
218. 1d. at 810. 
219. See Waters v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424, 434,709 P.2d 469, 475, 220 Cal. Rptr. 
666,673 (1985) (client sued her attorney for charging excessive fees for settling a case 
against her psychiatrist who sexually exploited her). But see Atienza v. Taub, 194 Cal. 
App. 3d 388, 239 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1987) (physician's sexual relationship with patient 
not medical malpractice where not initiated under guise of treatment). 
220. 771 P.2d 814 (1989). 
221. Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737 (1976). See also Tara Motors v. Superior 
Ct. (Jasper), 276 Cal. Rptr. 603, 669 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990). 
222. 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1988). 
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relationships, all help define the duty component of the fidu-
ciary duty which the attorney owes to his or her client.223 
A client alleging injuries similar to those suffered by Jeanne 
Metzger could allege that her attorney breached his fiduciary 
duty to her by violating rules 3-110 and 3-310.224 The client 
could also allege her attorney misused transference, thereby 
negating the client's consent through the exercise of undue 
influence, as discussed in Califonia Ethical Opinion No. 1987-
92.226. 
A third basis for civil liability might exist in violation of the 
ethical rules themselves.226 The only cases in California where 
such claims have been made involved third parties who sued 
opposing counsel based on those lawyers' conduct in the case 
against the third party.227 While recovery has been denied in 
these cases, a suit based on violations of ethical rules brought 
by a client against her own attorney is clearly distinguishable. 
It does not present the specter of chilling access to the courts 
that actions by third parties raise. 228 
Although other jurisdictions have generally denied recov-
ery where a cause of action is based solely on the breach of an 
ethical rule, those cases, like the California cases, have for the 
most part involved actions by third parties.229 A much more 
223. Id. at 343. See also Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 
1985). 
224. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
225. Op. 1987-92, supra note 61, at 40. 
226. See Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of 
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979). See generally Forell, 
The Interrelationship of Statutes and Tort Actions, 66 OR. L. REV. 219 (1987); Forell, 
The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A Statutory / Common Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REV. 
781 (1990). 
227. See, e.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2d Dist. Div. 4 1973). 
228. See Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981) in 
which the court sets out why it refuses to create a new tort action based on an ethi-
cal violation alleged by a third party. It points out that the legislature (or Bar) did 
not intend to create a tort action. Of course, this shouldn't stop the court from cre-
ating one so long as the legislature or Bar didn't clearly intend to bar such an action. 
It then points to other remedies, most notably malicious prosecution. Such an action 
is not available to a client injured as a result of attorney-client sex. And, at this point 
and time, no other remedy is available either. Finally the court pointed to the dan-
ger that exposing attorneys to liability to third parties could chill the public's access 
to the courts. This rationale is clearly inapplicable to attorney-client sex cases. Id. 
at 326, 630 P.2d at 848. 
229. See O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 613, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Bob Godfrey 
Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 291 Or. 318, 630 P.2d 840 (1981). Bob Godfrey lists the juris-
dictions which have rejected such an action. Id. at 325, 630 P.2d at 847. 
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compelling case for allowing an action based on violation of eth-
ical standards exists where the injured party is the attorney's 
client to whom he owed a fiduciary duty. 
A final basis for civil liability in a case like Jeanne Metzger's 
would be intentional infliction of emotional distress. McDaniel 
v. Gile allowed such an action where the client who was sexu-
ally harassed alleged both financial and emotional harm.
23o 
However, so long as the conduct is both intentional and out-
rageous, purely emotional harm is recoverable. To recover 
under this claim a client must show: (1) outrageous conduct 
by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard 
of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe 
emotional suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of 
the emotional distress.231 
As the McDaniel court noted, conduct is more likely to be 
found outrageous where a power relationship such as attorn-
eyclient exists.232 The kind of attorney conduct that Jeanne 
Metzger described in her personal statement satisfies both 
the "outrageous" and "intentional" elements of the action.233 
Metzger's attorney clearly acted both outrageously and inten-
tionally when he forced her to have oral sex in his office. It is 
quite likely that in some situations, like that of Jeanne Metzger, 
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can be 
made out where the attorney sexually exploits his client. 
In summary, at least four theories of recovery may be avail-
able to clients who allege emotional distress injuries from 
attorney-client sexual relations. It remains to be seen whether 
the California courts will do justice by allowing recovery under 
one or all of these bases. If the California courts refuse to allow 
recovery for emotional distress in this context, I would urge the 
California state legislature to enact a statute creating such lia-
bility.234 
230. McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991). 
231. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141,603 P.2d 58 
(1979). Accord McDaniel, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247. 
232. McDaniel, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 247. 
233. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
234. See, e.g., Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair 
Advantage of the «Fair" Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95,139-141 (1988) (proposed statute called 
"Uniform Sexual Exploitation Act" creating tort liability whenever a fiduciary has sex 
with his client). 
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IX. ILLINOIS 
As explained at the beginning ofthis paper, this is a tale of 
three jurisdictions. I have discussed the responses of Oregon 
and California to attorney-client sexual relations in detail. I 
will conclude with an examination of Illinois' treatment of 
this issue. What has occurred in Illinois is truly frightening. 
It is a demonstration of raw power silencing the voices of 
women clients who have been brutally victimized. 
Women who allege their attorneys have sexually exploited 
them in Illinois simply do not stand a chance of recovering for 
their injuries or seeing the offenders punished. Although 
approximately 50 complaints related to the sexual miscon-
duct of attorneys are brought to the attention of Illinois 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) 
each year, I have been unable to find a single reported case 
where an attorney was disciplined following such a com-
plaint.236 
Included among the attorneys who have not been publicly 
disciplined is the unnameable attorney who was sued by two 
of his clients in Suppressed v. Suppressed236 and Doe v. Roe237 • 
According to the Professor John Elson, the attorney who rep-
resented both of these clients in their suits against Mr. 
Unnameable, two additional women have filed formal 
grievances against this man, and Professor Elson knows of two 
other victims who have not yet come forward. 238 That makes 
six victims of a single attorney. Professor Elson told me that he 
felt it wa~ extremely unlikely that this attorney would be dis-
ciplined in any way because of these complaints.239 
The lack of any meaningful attorney discipline in Illinois 
leaves civil litigation as the only possible way to obtain a rem-
edy, punish the offenders, and let the public know who the sex-
235. California is no better. According to Henry Contreras, Chief Consultant to 
Assemblywoman Roybal-Allard, no attorneys have ever been publicly disciplined in 
California for sexual misconduct affecting their clients. Presentation on Attorney-
Client Sex, February 8, 1992, Golden Gate University School of Law. In contrast, 
Oregon has two recent cases in which an attorney was disciplined at least in part 
because he had sex with his client. See In re Ofelt, 1 D.B. Rptr. 22 (Or. 1985); In re 
Wolf, 312 Or. 655 (1992). 
236. 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1990). 
237. 756 F.Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
238. Chicago B. Ass'n Report, supra note 22, at 14. 
239. Telephone interview with Professor John Olson, Jan. 20, 1992. 
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ual predators are. But in Illinois that avenue has also been 
effectively eliminated. When Jeanne Metzger first planned to 
file her suit for money damages in Chicago against her attor-
ney in 1988, the attorney successfully obtained an injunction 
requiring that the filing of the suit be kept secret. Presiding 
Chancery Division Judge David J. Shields directed the clerk to 
accept the filing of Mr. Unnameable's complaint for injunctive 
relief "without revealing the names or identities of the par-
ties. "240 Judge Shields issued a temporary restraining order, 
impounded the file and ordered Metzger's attorney to file her 
suit with him instead of in the clerk's office.241 
Metzger's attorney, John Elson, filed the suit with Judge 
Shields as ordered. Since the suit alleged a tort, it actually 
belonged in the Law Division, so Judge Shields telephoned Law 
Division Presiding Judge Sorrentino and "explained the situ-
ation." An emergency closed door meeting was held, which also 
included Judge Foreman of the Law Division's motion sec-
tion.242 After this meeting Foreman impounded the Law 
Division file and imposed a gag order on Metzger and Elson for-
bidding them to discuss the names of the litigants or the con-
tents of the complaint with anyone.243 The gag order would 
automatically be lifted if Mr. Unnameable lost his pending 
motion to dismiss the complaint. However, he won the motion 
to dismiss, and even though the case came to an end when the 
Illinois Supreme Court declined review of Suppressed in 1990, 
those connected with the suit are still not sure if they would be 
found in contempt if they revealed the name of Metzger's for-
mer attorney.U4 
These proceedings appear to be in blatant violation of both 
constitutional and statutory law. For example, in Nixon v. 
Warner Communications,246 the United States Supreme Court 
said that "[it] is clear that the courts of this country recognize 
a general right to inspect and copy public records and docu-
ments, including judicial records and documents. "246 There is 
also a statutory right in Illinois to public access to court 
records. Illinois Revised Statutes, Ch. 25, Section 16 states that 
240. Warden, supra note 24, at 11·12. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. See supra note 35, where excerpts of the gag order are set out verbatim. 
244. Telephone interviews with Professor John Elson and attorney Margaret 
Paris, Jan. 20, 1992. 
245. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
246. Id. at 597. 
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"[a]11 records, dockets and books required by law to be kept by 
[circuit court] clerks shall be deemed public records, and shall 
at all times be open to public inspection .... "247 
Mr. Unnameable nonetheless succeeded in keeping his 
name from the public, a public which includes future victims 
of his sexual conduct. Judge Shields commented on his sup-
pression of the records by saying: "I knew this belonged in the 
Law Division and I didn't care what the Law Division did 
with it, but I didn't want the allegations to become public by 
accident. "248 Even more disturbing are the facts alleged in the 
RICO action against Mr. Unnameable by another former female 
client. The facts, as stated in the court's opinion, are as follows: 
In April 1983, Doe met Roe at a social gath-
ering. After inquiring about her divorce pro-
ceeding, Roe suggested Doe's counsel was 
inadequate and that he could do a better 
job. In June 1983, Doe went to Roe's office 
to discuss her divorce. Roe again derided the 
work of Doe's counsel and she decided to 
hire Roe instead. In July, Doe paid a $7,500 
retainer. No written agreement was entered 
into ... 
Doe placed great trust in Roe because 
he was her attorney and because she under-
stood he had an outstanding reputation. 
Additionally, because of the emotionally try-
ing nature of the divorce proceeding, Roe 
advised Doe on personal matters as well as 
legal matters. As a result, Doe developed a 
psychological dependency on Roe. On her 
second visit to Roe's office, Roe made sexu-
al advances. Doe initially resisted, but Roe 
persisted. Although Plaintiff felt repulsed 
by Roe's sexual advances, she submitted 
because of her fear that otherwise he would 
not represent her and that since she could 
not afford a retainer fee to hire a third coun-
sel in her divorce case, she might go unrep-
resented and lose both custody of her child 
and the opportunity for financial security for 
247. Warden, supra note 24, at 9. 
248. Id. 
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herself and her child. From 1983 through 
1988 Doe continued to submit to Roe's sex-
ual demands, at his offices, in her home, 
and'at other locations. Doe continued to do 
so because of both her emotional dependen-
cy and her fear of what would happen if she 
lost Roe's legal representation ... 
In November 1989, after Doe's present 
attorney first wrote a letter to Roe indicat-
ing Doe would seek redress for her injuries 
and that Roe should not contact Doe except 
through counsel, Roe nevertheless made 
threatening phone calls directly to Doe. 
Among other threats, he threatened to "rip 
Plaintiff to shreds," to "get everyone he knew 
to make her look terrible - like a slut," and 
to "get her for this." Roe also informed Doe 
"she should be concerned about her family, 
her reputation, and the success of her busi-
ness." Roe continued to make harassing 
phone calls to Doe at her house. Also, in 
December 1989, he sent her a note stating 
"DON'T DO THIS TO ME/YOU'LL BE 
SORRY." In January 1990, Roe approached 
Doe on a sidewalk in downtown Chicago 
and shouted obscene epithets at her. On 
an afternoon in June 1990, a middle-aged 
male in business attire, who was acting at 
Roe's direction, approached Doe at an inter-
section in downtown Chicago and made a 
vulgar sexual proposition. 249 
669 
This is just a portion of Doe's tale of abuse. Roe also went 
after Doe's attorney who is employed by Northwestern 
University in their law school's legal clinic: 
On October 4, 1990, Roe wrote Northwestern 
University's general counsel threatening to 
sue the University for malicious prosecu-
tion after the successful dismissal of the 
present lawsuit unless the University inter-
vened to have the lawsuit dismissed. Prior 
249. Doe v. Roe, 756 F. Supp, 353, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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to the letter, Roe is alleged to have had a 
friend who is a "prominent" Northwestern 
Law School alumnus contact the University's 
general counsel regarding Doe's continued 
representation by the Legal Clinic. The 
alumnus had also contacted Northwestern 
University Law School's current dean and 
former dean.26o 
The tale of Illinois has another chapter. When Albert 
Brooks Friedman sought to collect fees from his female divorce 
client, she refused to pay the $15,500 he claimed was owed, 
partly because he billed her for the hours they spent having sex-
ual intercourse.261 When Friedman sued to collect these fees, 
the trial court granted his motion for summary judgment and 
denied his former client's petition. On appeal the appellate 
court reversed the judgment and award of$16,392.17 in attor-
ney fees and remanded the case for trial. However, it express-
ly refused to reach the issue of whether the alleged sexual 
relationship breached Friedman's fiduciary duty.262 As men-
tioned earlier in this paper, after this case was filed the 
Supreme Court of Illinois appointed Friedman to the com-
mittee on character and fitness of the State Board of Law 
Examiners.263 
There may be some hope for Illinois, however. In his spe-
cial concurrence in In re Marriage of Kantar, Justice Greiman 
states that he believes Friedman's alleged sexual misconduct 
should have been addressed by the appellate court. He 
describes attorney-client sex as the legal profession's "dirty lit-
tle secret. "264 He then examines the issue in detail, and con-
cludes that "where there is an allegation of sexual relationship 
between a domestic relations lawyer and client ... [this] con-
stitutes a per se conflict of interest. "266 His remedy is excellent: 
once a sexual relationship occurs, the attorney's "per se conflict 
of interest ... would render his fees forfeit where the client 
250. Id. 
251. In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6, 9 (Ill. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1991). 
252. Id. at 11. 
253. Gill & Holt, Burpa note 24, at 10. 
254. 581 N.E.2d at 12. Attorneys in California keep dirty little secrets too. In 
McDaniel v. Gile the client who was sexually harassed by her attorney claimed that 
the attorney had done similar things to other women divorce clients "and that his rep-
utation for this was 'well known around the Ontario courthouse.'" 230 Cal. App. 3d 
363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242, 245 (1991). 
255. 581 N.E.2d at 12. 
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brings the matter to the attention of the court within a rea-
sonable time and provides evidence sufficient to carry her 
burden of proof. "268 
There have been some attempts towards change. The 
Illinois legislature at the behest of Jeanne Metzger57 passed a 
resolution in 1991 requesting "that a rule of professional con-
duct governing sexual relations between attorneys and their 
clients be adopted ... ".258 The legislature was dissuaded from 
passing a statute like California's by the weak argument that 
such a statute would violate separation ofpowers.259 Another 
ray of hope has come from the Chicago Bar Association, which 
has drafted a rule regulating attorney-client sex that the 
Association has forwarded to the Illinois Supreme Court.260 
X. CONCLUSION 
Attorney-client sex injures women and the legal profession. 
Only recently have these injuries begun to receive serious 
public scrutiny. The pressure to adopt ethical rules restrict-
ing attorney-client sex must continue. Similarly, courts should 
seriously consider imposing civil liability for physical and 
emotional injuries suffered from attorney-client sex. The law 
must no longer silence the voices of women clients who are 
victims of such conduct. If the courts and legal profession 
refuse to act, the state legislatures should. One possible leg-
islative remedy could be a statutory tort claim against any pro-
fessional who abuses his trust by sexually exploiting his client. 
A draft of such a statute was set out in a recent article by 
Professor Phyllis Coleman.261 The cause of action would be anal-
ogous to the sexual harassment actions now available where 
such harms occur in the workplace. 
The law profession's dirty little secret is secret no more. 
Hopefully, the light now being shed on it will cause change from 
within the legal profession before change from without is 
imposed. 
256. [d. at 16. 
257. Telephone interview with Jeanne Metzer, Jan. 28, 1992. 
258. S. Res. 361, 87th General Assembly, 1991 Illinois. 
259. Telephone interview with John Elson, Jan. 20, 1991. 
260. Grady, Crawford, & O'Brien, supra note 22. The proposed rule is set out 
supra note 136. 
261. See Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair 
Advantage of the "Fair- Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95,139·141 (1988). 
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